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L INTRODUCTION
Mutual knowledge of all relevant facts known to the litigants is
the essential' prerequisite to mitigating the sporting theory2 of
adversarial litigation. This laudable goal has not been imple-
mented judicially by the available discovery sanctions. These
sanctions have been characterized as either too lenient3 or insuffi-
cient,4 partially because of the lack of explicit power to impose
sanctions for all forms of discovery abuse.5
A classic instance of the sporting theory of litigation, which has
1. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). Two weeks after the effec-
tive date of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal decision recognized
that their primary purpose was to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive deter-
mination of every action, and [assure] that cases might be settled on their mer-
its." Nichols v. Sanborn Co., 24 F. Supp. 908, 910 (D. Mass. 1938).
2. See United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). See
also Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals
for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978).
3. Professor Rosenberg has characterized Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37,
the rule dealing with failure to make discovery, as a "paper tiger." Rosenberg,
New Philosophy of Sanctions, in NEW FEDERAL CIVIL DISCOVERY RULES
SOURCE3OOK 140, 141 (W. Treadwell ed. 1972). The United States Supreme Court,
in its leading discovery sanctions opinion, reinstated a trial court's dismissal
under Rule 37 for failure to comply with discovery obligations with this admoni-
tion:
[Tihe lenity evidenced by the Court of Appeals... cannot be allowed to
wholly supplant other and equally necessary considerations embodied in
that Rule.
If the decision of the Court of Appeals remained undisturbed in this
case . . . other parties to other lawsuits would feel freer than we think
Rule 37 contemplates they should feel to flout other discovery orders of
other district courts.
National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642-43
(1976). Some lenience may be justified when sufficient opportunity to obtain dis-
covery as to undisclosed witnesses or documents exists but is not utilized. Ed
Houser Enterprises, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 595 F.2d 366, 372 (7th Cir. 1979)
(no abuse of discretion in admitting witness and documentary evidence not dis-
closed in pretrial memorandum when opportunity for discovery not utilized).
4. The American Bar Association's Section on Litigation recently advised:
"The [Discovery Abuse] Committee is strongly of the view that existing Rule 37 is
insufficient to bring about the effective imposition of discovery sanctions." ABA
SECTION ON LITIGATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITrEE FOR THE STUDY OF DIS-
COVERY ABUSE 24 (1977) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE ABA CoMdrrEE].
5. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the
United States recently stated that there exists a need to make explicit the judicial
power to impose sanctions for all forms of discovery abuse. ADVISORY CODnrITEE
ON CIIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1978 PREML1-
NARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AM:ENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PRocE-
DURE, 77 F.R.D. 613, 653 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 PRELIMINARY DRAYr]. But
cf ADVISORY COMMITEE ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, REVISED PRELIMINARY DRAFr OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 80 F.R.D. 323, 344-48 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as 1979 REVISED PRELImINARY DRAFT] (Advisory Committee Note omitted opinion
regarding need for more explicit discovery sanctions).
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ironically received only tangential treatment by legal writers, 6 in-
volves whether7 and to what extent litigants must supplement
previous discovery responses. The adoption of Rule 26(e) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 provided a model for the emerg-
ing trend toward codifying the various federal and state ap-
proaches to this perplexing problem. However, existing sanctions
6. See 8 C. WsuGHr & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2048-
2050 (1970); Striegal, The Continuing Nature of Discovery, 34 J.B.A. KAN. 97, 97-100,
164-66 (1965); Note, The "Continuing" Nature of Discovery Techniques, 42 IowA L
REV. 579, 581-88 (1957); 31 Mo. L. REV. 158 (1966); 43 TENN. L REV. 124, 127-32 (1975);
Annot., 88 A.L.R. 2d 657 (1963). See generally Brown, Proposed Changes to Rule 33
Interrogatories and Rule 37 Sanctions, 11 ARIZ. L REV. 443, 455-56 (1969); Finman,
The Request for Admissions in Federal Civil Procedure, 71 YALE LJ. 371, 419, 425-
26 (1962); Johnston, Discovery in Illinois and Federal Courts, 2 JonN MARSHALL J.
PRAC. & PROC. 22, 69-70 (1968); Powers, A Guide to Interrogatories in California
Practice, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1250, 1264-66 (1975); Wicker, Tactical Advantages
from the Use of Discovery, 27 TENN. L. REV. 323, 334 (1960); Note, Discovery Prac-
tice in States Adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 HARv. L. REV. 673,
676-77 (1955); The Minnesota Supreme Court 1962-1963, 48 Mum. J. REV. 119, 174-77
(1963); Note, The Decline and Fall of Sanctions in California Discovery: Time to
Modernize California Code of Civil Procedure Section 2034, 9 U.S.F. L REV. 360,
386-88 (1974); Annot., 86 A.L.R. 3d 1089, 1092-95 (1978).
7. Interpretational problems spawned by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(e) are analyzed in Section III infra. The existence of a duty to supplement dis-
covery responses is uncertain in state courts such as California. Compare Singer
v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 2d 318, 353 P.2d 305, 5 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1960) (no duty to
supplement discovery responses) with Rangel v. Graybar Electric Co., 70 Cal. App.
3d 943, 950 n.6, 139 CaL Rptr. 191, 195 n.6 (1977) (now open to question whether con-
tinuing interrogatories are permitted in California).
8. The Federal Rules provide that:
A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a response that
was complete when made is under no duty to supplement his response to
include information thereafter acquired, except as follows:
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with
respect to any question directly addressed to (A) the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity
of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the sub-ject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his
testimony.
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he
obtains information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the re-
sponse was incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the response
though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are
such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing con-
cealment.(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the
court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new
requests for supplementation of prior responses.
FED. R. Crv. P. 26(e). A detailed but classic violation of this duty is illustrated in
Weiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 515 F.2d 449, 454 n.5 (2d Cir. 1975) (nonsupple-
mented interrogatory answers failed to identify undisclosed trial defense theory).
in the Federal Rules are inapplicable to violations of Rule 26(e).9
This rule resolved a decisional conflict as to the duty to supple-
ment prior discovery answers. Only the broad issue of whether
some form of supplementation was applicable in federal courts
was resolved. A myriad of narrower issues, generating conflict
among the federal circuits, remains subject to judicial resolution.
This article will examine how the federal courts have balanced
the burdens of supplementation with its benefits. It primarily
analyzes statutory construction of the continuing discovery duty.
Existing limitations on the federal requirement to amend certain
discovery responses can be transcended by more agressive use of
existing mechanisms for enforcement.
II. BALANCING BENEFITS AND BURDENS
Since Rule 26(e) was adopted in 1970,10 federal district court
judges have experienced a numerical caseload increase of fifty
per cent," accompanied by a dramatic increase in complex litiga-
tion.12 Both developments have spawned greater use of discovery
and sanctions for its abuse. The escalating annual cost of operat-
ing the federal court system is now in the half-billion-dollar
range.13 Expediting pretrial exchange of unadulterated discovery
information is inevitable if future litigants desire to avoid exces-
sive costs, delay, and ineffective judicial disposition of actions. 14
9. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (provides express sanctions for violation of court or-
ders but not for Rule 26(e) where violation usually not evident until commence-
ment of trial). For general provisions governing federal discovery, see FED. R. Civ.
P. 26. The extraordinary sanctions set forth in Rule 37 do not apply to the less
drastic discovery violations not enumerated in Rule 37. This rule authorizes ex-
plicit sanctions in relation to court orders and complete failure to respond to the
opponent's discovery efforts. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(a)-(d).
Inadequate supplementation rarely relates to court orders or to a complete fail-
ure to respond. Professor Rosenberg viewed Rule 37 as the exclusive authority for
sanctions for any discovery violation, at least prior to promulgation of Rule 26(e)
in 1970. Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLUm. L. REv.
480, 486 (1958). The United States Supreme Court viewed Rule 37 as the exclusive
source for sanctions involving that rule's enumerated violations. Societe Internati-
onale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.L v. Rogers, 357 U.S.
197, 207 (1958). See also Taggart v. Vermont Transp. Co., 32 F.R.D. 587 (E.D. Pa.
1963), affd per curiam, 325 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 1964) (power to exclude testimony for
failing to identify eyewitness pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) governing plaintiff
failure to comply with federal rules).
10. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Amended Rules, 48 F.R.D. 459 (1970)
(order establishing 1970 amendments--disapproved without comment by Justices
Black and Douglas).
11. DIRECTOR OF THE ADmiISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNrrED STATES COURTS,
ANuAL REPORT 152 (1976).
12. Id. at 125.
13. Shapiro, Managing the Judicial System: A Businessman's View, 64 A.B.A.
J. 1672, 1675 (1978).
14. The Chief Justice of the Second Circuit, which has the nation's heaviest
[VOL. 17: 233, 1980] Supplementation of Discovery
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Abuse of discovery to achieve the tactical advantage of surprise
retains rudiments of the allegedly extinguished age of trial by
combat.'5 Modern obstruction of the right to gather critical facts
in advance of trial generated problems that concerned the great
judicial publicists just prior to adoption of liberal discovery rules.
Speaking for the United States Supreme Court, Justice Cardozo
determined that, "[a]t times, cases will not be proved or will be
proved clumsily or wastefully, if the litigant is not permitted to
gather his evidence in advance."' 6
Such clumsiness and waste continued to thrive upon nondisclo-
sure of witnesses or claims, even after the equitable bill of discov-
ery17 was supplanted by.the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'S
Lack of familiarity and candor has infected the rather limited
docket of civil cases, advises that the problem focuses upon discovery where
"[1]itigation too often resembles the duels of the young gentlemen of San Fran-
cisco in the last century, who matched each other tossing gold coins into the bay
until one cried 'Enough!"' A Quicker Route to Court, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 5, 1977, at
84.
One of California's central district court judges advises that "many-maybe
most-cases do not justify the costs of litigation," possibly resulting in placement
of an abusive attorney on a judicial blacklist. Los Angeles Daily Journal, Sept. 1,
1978, at 1, cols. 4-5.
At least one federal district court in New York sought a one-year suspension of
the Speedy Trial Act's required trial within one hundred days of indictment. Los
Angeles Daily Journal, June 15, 1979, at 1, col. 1. Criminal cases, under the Speedy
Trial Act, take precedence over civil cases. Disposition of civil cases must be
streamlined to avoid continuances. and other problems associated with the highly
developed litigation art of discovery exploited to the disadvantage of an opponent,
particularly where failure to amend obsolete discovery results in surprise and de-
lays.
15. For treatises, articles, comments, and annotations dealing with the histori-
cal development of trial, see J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, HANDBOOK OF CoMMON LAW
PLEADING 536 n.1 (1969).
16. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 693
(1933) (bill of discovery will lie although facts to be discovered relate to damages
only).
17. See generally Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 241 F. 964
(S.D.N.Y. 1917) (discussion of procedure for obtaining a Federal Equity Rule 58
Bill of Discovery); Harkelroad, The Law of Discovery in the Courts of California, 4
S. CAL. L. REv. 169, 175-78 (1931); Legislation-The Bill of Discovery under Re-
formed Procedure, 44 HARv. L. REV. 633 (1931).
18. See generally Kaufman, Some Observations on Pre-Trial Examinations in
Federal and State Courts, 12 F.R.D. 363 (1952) (comparison of federal rules, em-
phasizing discovery, and state rules, emphasizing production of proof or evidence
admissible at trial); Pollack, Discovery---Its Abuse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219
(1978) (discovery procedures have acquired justified reputation of being hope-
lessly secretive, unnecessarily complex, and prohibitively expensive).
duty to supplement responses applicable to depositions,1 9 inter-
rogatories, 20 production of documents, 21 physical and mental ex-
aninations,2 2 and requests for admissions. 23
A. General Duty Expressly Negated
There is no general duty to supplement discovery responses in
federal litigation. Rule 26(e) expressly negates such a duty be-
cause "[a] party who has responded to a request for discovery
with a response that was complete when made is under no duty
to supplement his response to include information thereafter ac-
quired... ,,24 except in a limited number of situations.25
The Advisory Committee Note to the 1967 Preliminary Draft26
and to the 1970 Revised Draft27 of the new supplementation re-
quirement crystallized two closely related problems. Dual con-
cern was expressed over how to balance the advantages and
disadvantages of continuing discovery and whether to manifest
the result of this balancing process with a broad or limited rule.
The Committee favored imposing a duty to update previous re-
19. Voegeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89, 96 (8th Cir. 1977) (unremedied failure to ad-
vise appellant of change in deposition testimony prior to trial required new trial).
20. Laclede Gas Co. v. G.W. Warnecke Corp., 78 F.R.D. 502, 504 (E.D. Mo. 1978),
affid, 604 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1979) (dismissal for failure to update response to ex-
pert witness interrogatory). It is axiomatic that "[d]iscovery by interrogatory re-
quires candor in responding." Dollar v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 616 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).
21. Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1341-42 (5th Cir. 1978) (interro-
gatory response suggested nonexistence of document although house counsel sub-
sequently discovered it but failed to amend party's inaccurate response, resulting
in a finding of discovery misrepresentation); United States v. IBM, 83 F.R.D. 92, 96
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (responsive documents created after return of subpoena subject to
production). See also Pare v. Rodique, 256 Md. 204, 260 A.2d 313 (1969) (preamble
triggers continuing burden to provide documents sought by interrogatory based
upon moral duty drawn from federal cases).
22. Nutt v. Black Hills Stage Lines, Inc., 452 F.2d 480, 482 (8th Cir. 1971) (fail.
ure to seasonably notify adversary regarding new claim stemming from undis-
closed physical examination resulted in new trial); Szilvassy v. United States, 71
F.R.D. 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (failure to supplement interrogatory responses regard-
ing previous physical examination noted during defendant's physical examination
of plaintiff).
23. See generally Finman, The Request for Admissions in Federal Civil Proce-
dure, 71 YALE LJ. 371, 425-26 (1962) (discussion of amendment resulting in with-
drawal of prior admissions).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e) (emphasis added).
25. See note 8 supra.
26. ADVISORY COMMrITEE ON CIVIL RuLEs OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PRELIINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED ALIENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 43 F.R.D. 211, 237 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 PRE-
imINARY DRAFr].
27. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVII PROCEDURE RELATING TO DISCOV-
ERY, 48 F.R.D. 487, 507 app. 2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 AMENDMENTS].
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sponses in order to mitigate the need for or the tactic of refiling
similar interrogatories, 28 a natural byproduct of the 1948 amend-
ment which permitted more than one set of interrogatories with-
out leave of court.29
Local rules in the federal district courts that previously im-
posed a duty to supplement responses 30 and the leading case of
Taggart v. Vermont Transportation Co.3 1 influenced the Advisory
Committee's consideration of the supplementation issue.3 2 A
Pennsylvania federal district court local rule provided that:
"Upon discovery by any party of information which renders that
party's prior answers to interrogatories substantially inaccurate,
incomplete or untrue, such party shall file appropriate supple-
mental answers with reasonable promptness." 33 This explicit
rule, coupled with the judge's inherent power under Rule 41(b),34
was utilized in Taggart to exclude the testimony of a surprise
eyewitness not listed in response to an eyewitness interro-
gatory.35 Reliance upon Rule 41(b) was apparently misplaced.36
However, reliance upon the local rule of court signaled emerging
recognition of the inherent judicial power to compel supplementa-
tion of obsolete responses.37 This power was confirmed by the Ju-
28. See 1967 PRELImINARY DRAFr, supra note 26, at 237; 1970 AhiENDMENTs,
supra note 27, at 507.
29. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS
OF THE UNITED STATES, 5 F.R.D. 433, 461 (1946) [hereinafter cited as 1948 AMEND-
MENTs] (last sentence of previous Rule 33, permitting one set of interrogatories
without leave of court, stricken because of need for inexpensive means of updat-
ing discovery information).
30. D. ME. R. 15(c); E.D. PA. R. 25(f).
31. 32 F.R.D. 587 (E.D. Pa. 1963), a.fd per curiam, 325 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 1964).
32. See 1967 PRELuMNARY DP,&Fr, supra note 26, at 237; 1970 AMENDMENTS,
supra note 27, at 507.
33. Taggart v. Vermont Transp. Co., 32 F.RD. 587, 589 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1963), afd
per curiam, 325 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 1964).
34. This rule provides that "[f] or failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to com-
ply with these rules... a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any
claim against him." FED. R. CIv. P. 41(b).
35. Taggart v. Vermont Transp. Co., 32 F.R.D. 587, 590-91 (E.D. Pa. 1963), affd
per curiam, 325 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 1964).
36. The United States Supreme Court had previously determined that "harsh"
discovery sanctions were solely controlled by FED. R. Civ. P. 37. Societe Internati-
onale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S.
197 (1958), noted in 107 U. PA. T. REV. 103 (1958).
37. Compare Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Com-
merciales, S. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (improper dismissal entered against
party for failure to comply with discovery order where good faith compliance sub-
jected party to criminal penalties), with National Hockey League v. Metropolitan
dicial Conference of the United States in adopting Rule 26(e).3 0
The most serious objection to an unlimited continuing duty was
that it would result in complex and protracted litigation.39 The at-
torney, not the party, bears the responsibility for periodic
rechecking and recanvassing of new information to be transmit-
ted to the adversary by way of updated responses. The Advisory
Committee, cognizant of the possibility of an undue burden,
noted:
In practice, therefore, the lawyer under a continuing burden must periodi-
cally recheck all interrogatories and canvass all new information. But a
full set of new answers may no longer be needed by the interrogating
party. Some issues will have been dropped from the case, some questions
are now seen as unimportant, and other questions must in any event be
reformulatedAo
The decision in the critical case of Novick v. Pennsylvania Rail-
road41 effectively struck the balance for the rulemakers who, in
light of the wording of the adopted supplementation rule,4 2 con-
doned neither the absence of any continuing burden nor the
adoption of an unlimited rule mandating supplementation of all
responses regardless of materiality. Novick was the tenth re-
ported federal decision 43 to deal with discovery abuse spawned by
Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiam) (dismissal properly entered
against party for failure to comply with discovery obligation to answer interrogato-
ries), and Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962) (dismissal properly entered
against party for failure of his counsel to attend pretrial conference).
38. The revision of the Advisory Note to Proposed Rule 26(e) added a para-
graph which patently recognized that "[t]he duty will normally be enforced, in
those limited instances where it is imposed, through sanctions imposed by the
trial court, including exclusion of evidence, continuance, or other action, as the
court may deem appropriate." 1970 AMENDMENTS, supra note 27, at 508. But cf.
1979 REVISED PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 5, at 344-48 (unexplained deletion of
prior draft opinion expressing need for a rule providing explicit authority to im-
pose sanctions for all forms of discovery abuse, regardless of whether court order
violated). A leading scholar has implicitly criticized this lack of explicit authority.
See Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173 (1979)(too much discretion in too many areas now accorded to trial judges by appellate
courts).
39. See 1967 PRELmiNARY DRAFT, supra note 26, at 237-38; 1970 AMENDMENTS,
supra note 27, at 507. See generally Becker, Modern Discovery: Promoting Effi-
cient Use and Preventing Abuse of Discovery in the Roscoe Pound Tradition, 78
F.R.D. 267 (1978).
40. 1970 AMENDMENTS, supra note 27, at 507.
41. 18 F.R.D. 296 (W.D. Pa. 1955) ("continuing" interrogatory not broadly per-
mitted but limited to circumstances where very nature of interrogatory should re-
quire continuing answers or where information obtainable at pretrial conference
would not afford sufficient basis to prepare case).
42. For the text of FED. R. Crv. P. 26(e), see note 8 supra. The wording of the
rule is nearly identical to that in Diversified Prod. Corp. v. Sports Center Co., 42
F.R.D. 3, 5 (D. Md. 1967), cited in 1970 AMENDMENTS, supra note 27, at 508. The
Committee's supporting rationale for avoiding the onerous burden of an unlimited
duty was based upon the Novick opinion. Id. at 507.
43. See RCA Mfg. Co. v. Decca Records, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (de-
fendant should furnish information acquired between answer and trial, but not
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the absence of a continuing duty to supplement,44 although sup-
plementation was available through the medium of multiple sets
of interrogatories. 45
Prior to Novick, four opinions by the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania had exclusively crystallized the
controversy over the effect of a preambular statement requiring
supplementation, absent any authority in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.4 6 The first of these pre-Novick opinions, Wolf v.
prevented from offering new evidence as function of interrogatories is not to limit
defendant's proof); Cinema Amusements, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 318 (D. Del.
1947) (information required by interrogatories confined to period prior to com-
mencement of action, however, information obtained between answer and trial
szould be furnished to adversary); Chenault v. Nebraska Farm Prod., Inc., 9 F.R.D.
529 (D. Neb. 1949) (first federal court to order supplementation of responses as
condition precedent to trial admissibility of newly discovered information); New-
sum v. Pennsylvania R.R., 97 F. Supp. 500, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (new trial sanction
for failure to update interrogatory answers regarding lay witnesses in "violation of
the rules of civil procedure"); Fidelis Fisheries, Ltd. v. Thorden, 12 F.R.D. 179
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (never duty to supplement trial witness list, only witnesses with
knowledge of relevant facts); Wolf v. Dickinson, 16 F.R.D. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (pre-
amble triggers duty to supplement, giving effect to full disclosure purpose of fed-
eral rules); Smith v. Acadia Overseas Freighters, Ltd., 120 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Pa.
1953) (no preamble requiring supplementation; however, furnishing answers to in-
terrogatories until date of trial is means of accomplishing full disclosure object of
federal rules); Furmanek v. Southern Trading Co., 15 F.R.D. 405 (E.D. Pa. 1953)
(Admiralty Rule of Civil Procedure permits preamble requiring supplementation
of interrogatory responses in absence of express rule); McNally v. Yellow Cab Co.,
16 F.R.D. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1954) (good faith and spirit of federal rules requires an-
swers to be truthful at time of trial as well as at time of answers to interrogato-
ries).
44. Novick was decided 15 years prior to adoption of the federal duty to sup-
plement certain categories of information by express rule. See text of FED. R. Crv.
P. 26(e), note 8 supra.
45. The original rules provided: "No party may, without leave of court, serve
more than one set of interrogatories to be answered by the same party." FED. R.
Crv. P. 33; 5 F.R.D. 433, 461 (1946) (proposal that this last sentence of original rule
be stricken). The 1948 Amendments deleted this portion of the rule, which was
applicable to only two of the nine pre-Novick cases. See note 43 supra. See also
1948 AmENDMENTs, supra note 29 at 461-62. However, the succinct remark in a re-
cent federal opinion suggests that litigants are not prone to utilize discovery prop-
erly. 'There have been many justified complaints about the misuse of discovery.
The docket sheet demonstrates that, in this case as in most, discovery was abused
primarily by non-use." Shelak v. White Motor Co., 581 F.2d 1155, 1164 (5th Cir.
1978) (footnotes omitted) (Rubin, J., dissenting, citing P. CoNoLLY, E. HouzliMAN,
& M. KUHLmAN, JuDiciAL CoNTRois AND THE CiVIL LITGATVE PRocEss: DIScOVERY
28 (1978).
46. McNally v. Yellow Cab Co., 16 F.R.D. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1954); Smith v. Acadia
Overseas Freighters, Ltd., 120 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Pa. 1953); Furmanek v. Southern
Trading Co., 15 F.R.D. 405 (E.D. Pa. 1953); Wolf v. Dickinson, 16 F.R.D. 250 (E.D. Pa.
1953).
Dickinson,47 overruled the objection that imposing a continuing
duty to supplement was intolerably burdensome. The unilaterally
imposed preamble triggered an otherwise nonexistent duty to
supplement,48 so as to implement a primary goal of the federal
discovery rules; namely, full disclosure.49 The other pre-Novick
decisions dealing with preambles nurtured embryonic develop-
ment of continuing discovery in federal courts. These decisions
fashioned a duty to supplement, supported by the distinct
grounds of stare decisis,50 the Federal Supplemental Rules for
Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims,51 and unadorned reli-
ance upon the "good faith and the spirit of the [rules]." 52
From the vantage point of these analyses, Novick v. Penn-
sylvania Railroad forecast the Federal Rules' approach to this
discovery problem. Novick was an action brought under the Fed-
eral Employer's Liability Act 5 3 involving proper interrogatory pro-
cedure under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
47. 16 F.R.D. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (interrogating party's preambular statement
rendered interrogatories continuing so as to require supplementation if further in-
formation obtained by interrogated party between time of original responses and
trial).
48. Id. at 252.
49. The interrogatories filed by plaintiff included a preamble affecting each in-
terrogatory by specifically stating- 'These interrogatories shall be deemed contin-
uing, so as to require supplemental answers if defendant obtains further
information between the time answers are served and the time of trial." Id. The
court specified:
Thus, we hold that the interrogatories continue to speak and the defend-
ant is obliged to furnish supplemental answers if he obtains additional in-
formation between the time answers are filed and the time of trial....
The holding, we feel, gives effect to one of the primary purposes of the
rules, that of full disclosure before trial of all the facts'which are relevant
to the subject matter or issues of the case and which are not privileged.
Id.
50. Smith v. Acadia Overseas Freighters, Ltd., 120 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
The court, dealing with whether a continuing duty to supplement existed, stated:
We feel however that the matter is governed by an order of this Court...
in Wolf v. Dickinson .... [I]n the present case it was not specified that
the interrogatories ... were to be deemed continuing. Nevertheless, we
hold that they are, on the strength of the views expressed by us in Wolf v.Dickinson ....
Id. at 192-93.
51. Furmanek v. Southern Trading Co., 15 F.R.D. 405 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (disre-
garding nonsupplementation argument under Admiralty Rule 31, pursuant to Wolf
and Smith decisions, see notes 47 & 50 supra).
52. McNally v. Yellow Cab Co., 16 F.R.D. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1954). The court chose
not to pass upon an objection to a preamble imposing a duty to supplement inter-
rogatory responses, but expressed in dicta:
[I]t may not be out of place for the Court to say at this time what should
be obvious, namely, that the defendant is bound to give truthful answers
to the interrogatories and that both good faith and the spirit of the Rule
require it to see to it that its answers are truthful as of the time of the trial
as well as of the time when the interrogatories are answered.
Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
53. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
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The plaintiffs had prefaced their questions with the statement
that "[t] hese interrogatories shall be deemed continuing, so as to
require supplemental answers if defendant obtains further infor-
mation between the time answers are served and the time of
trial."5 4 The defendant's unsuccessful contention was that the
Federal Rules neither expressly55 nor impliedly56 permitted the
interrogating party to characterize responses as "continuing to
speak." Novick overtly crystallized the concern that burdens
might outweigh benefits if supplementation was applicable to all
interrogatories or discovery responses. 57
The alternative of no duty to supplement would require re-
sponses to multiple sets of same-subject interrogatories. An un-
limited duty would reduce or eliminate paperwork associated
with the discovery amendment allowing multiple sets of interrog-
atories addressed to the same facts or issues.5 8 It would also en-
tail the detailed rechecking of all previous discovery responses, a
costly and time consuming task in the case of depositions, with-
out regard to the impact of the newly acquired information. How-
ever, overzealous supplementation of nonessential matters could
degenerate into an "ideal" form of confusing discovery abuse.
The alternative of an unlimited duty to supplement would require
frequent rechecking of all responses to all previous discovery
without regard to case complexity or subsequent immateriality.
The party burdened with such a duty could burden his opponent
54. Novick v. Pennsylvania R.R., 18 F.D. 296, 297 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
55. Prior to 1970 and at the time of the Novick decision, there was no express
federal provision requiring parties to update responses no longer accurate. Incor-
rect answers could be the basis for appropriate sanctions. See authorities cited
note 6 supra.
56. Plaintiff could resubmit identical interrogatories to ascertain the existence
of new information, thereby supporting the legislative intent not to limit the ex-
change of information without imposing a continuous burden to periodically up-
date answers to interrogatories. See generally Novick v. Pennsylvania M.R., 18
F.R.D. 296, 297 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
57. See notes 49, 50, 52 supra, indicating that supplementation is required in
all instances. Contemporary concern with this problem was demonstrated by a re-
cent California decision. Rangel v. Graybar Elec. Co., 70 Cal. App. 3d 943, 950 n.6,
139 CaL Rptr. 191, 195 n.6 (1977) (it is now open to question whether continuing
interrogatories are permitted in California).
58. As pointed out by the Novick court, "under the language of [amended]
Rule 33, it is provided, inter alia: 'The number of interrogatories ... to be served
is not limited except as justice requires to protect the party from annoyance, ex-
pense, embarrassment, or oppression."' Novick v. Pennsylvania R.R., 18 F.R.D.
296, 297 (WOD. Pa. 1955). See also FED. R. CIrv. P. 33; 5 F.R.D. 433, 461 (1946) (Advi-
sory Committee Report setting forth previous limited interrogatory rule).
with a plethora of amended responses.5 9
To derive the benefit of continuing discovery with its related
burden of amending prior responses, while avoiding the burden of
a universal application of the duty to supplement responses,
Novick struck a balance between the competing alternatives. The
court limited the duty to supplement by its analysis that:
It is only in those circumstances where the very nature of the interro-
gatory should require continuing answers, or where the information ob-
tainable at pretrial would not afford the party sufficient time and
opportunity to prepare his case, that the court should treat an interro-
gatory as "continuing." Otherwise, parties may be burdened with the re-
quirement of providing a myriad of scraps of information which could
prove of little aid to either party.60
Prior to Novick, state courts had adopted a trial sanction ap-
proach to surprise generated by lack of candor in discovery re-
sponses.61 Shortly after Novick, the state cases began to
incorporate the federal approach to this complex problem.62
Some jurisdictions reoriented their approach toward inaugurating
an open season on facts, thereby discarding the "cards-up-the-
sleeve" psychology of civil litigation. This was accomplished by
requiring supplementation in the absence of a codified rule.63
However, latent reactionism to the propriety of continuing an-
swers was most evident in the leading case of Smith v. Superior
Court.6 4 The court in Smith balanced the burdens of continuing
answers against the benefits of the Novick limited burden ap-
proach. The Smith court rejected the possibility of any continu-
ing answers, as permitted in Novick, in the absence of court
order. The California rule 65 differed from the federal rule in that
59. The interrogating party, entitled to unlimited amendment from the interro-
gated party, could be similarly burdened by receipt of amended responses which
are no longer needed or important. Overcompliance with the duty to amend could
result in abuse or counterabuse.
60. Novick v. Pennsylvania R.R, 18 F.R.D. 296, 298 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
61. Evtush v. Hudson Bus Transp. Co., 7 N.J. 167, 81 A.2d 6 (1951) (new trial
because of error in permitting testimony of undisclosed witness at trial); Ab-
batemarco v. Colton, 31 N.J. Super. 181, 106 A.2d 12 (App. Div. 1954) (reversing de-
nial of mistrial for exclusion of deposition testimony of unavailable and unlisted
sole eyewitness, although express state rule required timely amendment of an-
swers to interrogatories); Sather v. Lindahl, 43 Wash. 2d 463, 261 P.2d 682 (1953)
(granting of new trial reversed although party's deposition testimony, four days
prior to trial, attested to an awareness of the personal injury witnesses he pro-
duced at trial).
62. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Diamond State Bus Lines, Inc., 50 Del. 163, 125 A.2d
856 (Super. Ct. 1956) (under federal rule, counsel not relieved of obligation to sup-
plement responses when additional information acquired).
63. See, e.g., D'Agostino v. Schaffer, 45 N.J. Super. 395, 398, 133 A.2d 45, 48
(App. Div. 1957) (noting joint responsibility of bench and bar to gear litigation to
trial on the merits rather than craftiness or guile).
64. 189 Cal. App. 2d 6, 11 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1961).
65. The state rule then provided. "No party may serve more than one set of
interrogatories to be answered by the same adverse party, except with leave of
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a California litigant could not ask for continuing interrogatories
without leave of the court.66 The Smith court recognized that
neither a second set of interrogatories nor continuing interrogato-
ries were generally available to update witness information as in
Novick.67 However, the Smith court did not venture any com-
mentary regarding whether only court approved supplementa-
tion 68 was a justifiable substitute for continuing discovery.
The contemporary decision in Gebhard v. Niedzwiecki69 also
noted the respective burdens imposed by multiple sets of inter-
rogatories and a continuing duty to supplement responses as ana-
lyzed in Smith. The Gebhard trial court had suppressed the
testimony of surprise witnesses disclosed at trial.70 The duty to
amend obsolete witness responses was extended to all phases of
the action although the witnesses were not discovered until after
trial had begun.7 1 The appellate court reasoned that responses
must always be accurate and complete72 in order to avoid the sup-
pression sanction pursuant to Minnesota's rule patterned upon
the federal model.7 3 Contemporary state courts had held to the
contrary,7 4 avoided the issue,76 or given up trying to articulate a
court obtained on motion after notice." CAL Crv. PROC. CODE § 2030(a), quoted in
Smith v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 2d 6, 11, 11 Cal. Rptr. 165, 169 (1961).
66. For the text of then existing Federal Rule 33, see note 58 supra.
67. Multiple sets of interrogatories and imposition of a continuing burden to
supplement responses were then available only with leave of court. CAL CIrv.
PRoc. CODE § 2030(a), quoted in Smith v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 2d 6, 11, 11
Cal. Rptr. 165, 169 (1961).
68. For the text of the statute, see note 65 supra. California has since pro-
vided for a statutory continuing duty as to trial experts. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE
§§ 2037, 2037.6 (West Cum. Supp. 1980). As stated in a recent California decision:
It is apparently an open question whether continuing interrogatories may
be used in this state. (Smith v. Superior Court... holding that they may
not was decided on the basis of old Code Civ. Proc., § 2030, subd. (a),
which required leave of court for one party to file more than one set of in-
terrogatories on the same adverse party.)
Rangel v. Graybar Elec. Co., 70 Cal. App. 3d 943, 950 n.6, 139 Cal. Rptr. 191, 195 n.6
(1977). See also West Hills Hosp. v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 3d 656, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 645 (1979) (new expert witness rule judicially established by writ of man-
date).
69. 265 Minn. 471, 477 n.8, 122 N.W.2d 110, 114 n.8 (1963) (citing Smith).
70. Id. at 475, 122 N.W.2d at 113.
71. Id. at 479, 122 N.W.2d at 116.
72. Id. at 476, 122 N.W.2d at 115; see text accompanying note 79 infra; cf. fed-
eral authorities cited notes 128-30 infra (excluding unseasonable supplementa-
tion).
73. Gebhard v. Niedzwiecki, 265 Minn. 471, 476, 122 N.W.2d 110, 114 (1963).
74. See, e.g., Capone v. Norton, 8 N.J. 54, 83 A.2d 710 (1951) (interrogated party
need not gratuitously provide new witness information if original response truth-
ful and complete when made).
75. Where the trial court exclusion of eyewitness testimony was reversed for
new trial, the court stated that:
specific approach to the obsolete discovery answer since "it [was]
impossible to lay down any rule as to the proper course to be fol-
lowed in such circumstances."76
In Gebhard, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the al-
ternatives of a preamble triggering the duty to supplement or the
repeated submission of same-subject interrogatories until trial.77
The court rejected both alternatives, specifically drawing from the
rationale of federal decisions that had also characterized varying
preambles and successive interrogation as unnecessarily burden-
some.78 Drawing upon Novick, the court held that the Minnesota
rule permitted continuing interrogatories although:
[tihe application of this rule should not require the disclosure of every bit
of information discovered after the answers are served, but should require
that any information which is of a substantial nature and which will
render the answers theretofore served untruthful, unreliable, or incom-
plete must be disclosed. Certainly, in a case such as this, the discovery of
witnesses that a party intends to call comes within the area of information
which must-be disclosed.79
This approach injected the ingredient of timely discovery supple-
mentation as required by later federal cases8 0 and the Federal
Rule requirement of seasonable supplementation. 81
B. Limited Duty Unfurled
Continued resistance to the required exchange of essential dis-
covery information8 2 impeded development of an explicit continu-
ing duty to amend obsolete discovery responses. 83 Judicial reac-
tion to the advantages of such supplementation was nonexis-
For the purpose of this appeal it is not necessary for this court to decide
whether plaintiff was required by Missouri discovery rules to amend his
original answers and advise defendant of information learned since filing
them. The essential question for our decision is not whether plaintiff tech-
nically conformed to the prescribed procedures of civil practice. Our con-
cern is whether the trial court acted within the bounds of its own
authority.
Aulgur v. Zylich, 390 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Mo. App. 1965).
76. Id. at 556 (quoting 2A W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 776, at 44 (Supp. 1963-64)).
77. Gebhard v. Niedzwiecki, 265 Minn. 471, 477, 122 N.W.2d 110, 114 (1963).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 478, 122 N.W.2d at 115 (1963).
80. See authorities cited notes 84-86 infra.
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e) (1), (2). See text accompanying notes 118-40 in!fra.
82. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
83. See notes 55-59 and accompanying text supra.
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tent,8 4 faintly implicit,8 5 or limited to the Third Circuit.86 These
methods of resolution divided the federal circuits during the in-
terim period bridging the Novick v. Pennsylvania Railroad analy-
sis87 and the rulemakers' 1967 proposal.88 A uniform federal
approach had not materialized completely.89 The maze of opin-
ions, therefore, necessitated resolution of this problem, which was
clearly identified only two years after adoption of the Federal
84. Wray M. Scott Co. v. Daigle, 309 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1962) (failure to list lay
witness placed burden of demonstrating prejudice on adversary); Bell v. Swift &
Co., 283 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1960) (permitting defendant's undisclosed witness to tes-
tify deemed erroneous; however, plaintiffs burden of proving substantial error not
met); Wroblewski v. Exchange Ins. Ass'n, 273 F.2d 158 (7th Cir. 1959) (no abuse of
discretion in permitting testimony although court-ordered answer did not identify
prospective witness); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Buckles, 232 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 351 U.S. 984 (1956) (expert testimony permitted notwithstanding violation of
pretrial conference order); Gorsha v. Commercial Transp. Corp., 38 F.R.D. 188
(E.D. La. 1965) (multiple sets of interrogatories under Rule 33 characterized as su-
perior to implying a continuing burden of supplementation); Wedding v. Tallant
Transfer Co., 37 F.R.D. 8 (N.D. Ohio 1963) (complete and timely response to inter-
rogatories is largely dependent upon integrity of counsel in case where interroga-
tories lack "common request" that they be continuing).
85. Halverson v. Campbell Soup Co., 374 F.2d 810 (7th Cir. 1967) (exclusion of
lay testimony deemed abuse of discretion notwithstanding reliance upon interro-
gatory which appellee failed to supplement); Clark v. Pennsylvania R.R., 328 F.2d
591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1006 (1964) (affirming receipt of lay testimony
notwithstanding omission from pretrial statement where no motion for mistrial or
continuance); Globe Cereal Mills v. Scrivener, 240 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1956) (no
abuse of discretion in excluding exhibits and lay testimony not identified in pre-
trial order pursuant to Rule 16); Wembley, Inc. v. Diplomat Tie Co., 216 F. Supp.
565 (D. Md. 1963) (failure to supplement interrogatory answer regarding lay wit-
nesses constitutes grounds for sanctions; however, doubts resolved against imposi-
tion of sanctions).
86. Chisholm v. Board of Pub. Educ., 33 F.R.D. 313 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (local rule
specifically requiring supplementation regarding existence of documents); Frankel
v. Stake, 33 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (local rule specifically required supplemental
responses to avoid unfair advantage inherent in reliance on stated lack of witness
statements); Taggart v. Vermont Transp. Co., 32 F.R.D. 587 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (lay tes-
timony excluded for violation of local rule requiring continuing answers), affid per
curiam, 325 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 1964); Lunn v. United Aircraft Corp., 25 F.R.D. 186
(D. Del. 1960) (truthfully answered lay witness interrogatory deemed continuing
pursuant to local rule).
Only one decision beyond those of the Third Circuit courts fully adopted a duty
to supplement lay and expert witness information prior to the 1967 official propo-
sal by the Advisory Committee of a continuing duty. The same court had previ-
ously resolved doubts against sanctions under similar circumstances. Compare
Diversified Prod. Corp. v. Sports Center Co., 42 F.RD. 3 (D. Md. 1967), with Wem-
bley, Inc. v. Diplomat Tie Co., 216 F. Supp. 565 (D. Md. 1963). This result may be
explained by the Diversified Products opinion's proximity to promulgation of the
Advisory Committee's proposal seven months later.
87. 18 F.R.D. 296 (W.D. Pa. 1955). See text accompanying notes 55-59 supra.
88. See 1967 PRELIMINARY DRAFT, .s'upra note 26, at 228 (rule), 237-38 (note).
The proposed rule, as amended, was adopted in 1970. See 1970 AmENDMENTS,
supra note 27, at 459. For the text of the adopted rule, see note 8 supra.
89. See notes 84-86 supra.
Rules of Civil Procedure.9 0 The Advisory Committee, apparently
concerned with all discovery devices rather than simply interrog-
atories, posited its concern that, "the issue is acute when new in-
formation renders substantially incomplete or inaccurate an
answer which was complete and accurate when made. It is essen-
tial that the rules provide an answer to this question. The parties
can adjust to a rule either way, once they know what it is."91
The Advisory Committee did not advocate, and probably could
not have justified, a blanket rule of unlimited continuing discov-
ery. The primary advantage of such a rule would have been the
reduction of paperwork associated with an amendment to the in-
terrogatory rule that permitted multiple sets of interrogatories
without leave of court.92 This means of supplementation did not
depend upon the interrogated party to amend prior responses, al-
though it was susceptible to excessive use by the interrogating
party. Other advantages were the elimination of surprise and pro-
motion of economical litigation. But the primary disadvantage as-
sociated with a continuing duty to supplement all responses was
deemed to be that of visiting an intolerable burden upon a party's
lawyer.93 This forced the Advisory Committee to rely on cases
such as Novick and Diversified Products Corp. v. Sports Center
Co.,94 which limited the burden to the most essential information.
Rule 26(e) was apparently derived from language in the district
court's foundation in Diversified Products.95
90. As stated by a relevant decision: "If in the interim, between the time of
the answers to these interrogatories and the trial, defendants obtain further infor-
mation, they will not be prevented from offering such further information on the
trial and should under this interrogatory furnish it to plaintiff when it is obtained."
RCA Mfg. Co. v. Decca Records, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (emphasis
added).
91. 1967 PRELIMINARY DRAFr, supra note 26, at 237; see 1970 AMENDMENTS,
supra note 27, at 507. The Committee focused upon "interrogatories (and ques-
tions at deposition as well as requests for inspection and admissions)." 1967 PRE-
i.mmARY DRAFT, supra note 26, at 237.
The other formal discovery tool, the physical and mental examination, would in-
directly be subject to a continuing burden to advise a party of a physical or mental
examination conducted after responding to any other discovery device seeking
such information. See generally authorities cited note 22 supra. The continuing
burden has its most profound effect upon interrogatories, the most convenient and
typically the most inexpensive tool for obtaining documentary, witness, and other
discovery information.
92. See 1948 AMENDMENTS, note 29 supra.
93. 1967 PRELIMINARY DRAFr, supra note 26, at 238; 1970 AMENDMENTS, supra
note 29, at 507.
94. 42 F.R.D. 3 (D. Md. 1967) (construction of duty nearly identical to subse-
quently proposed rule).
95. As stated by the court:
Unless otherwise ordered by the Court or by agreement of parties, a party
who has responded to a request for discovery with an answer that was
complete when made is under no duty to supplement his answer to in-
clude information thereafter acquired, except that he is under a duty sea-
[VOL. 17: 233, 1980] Supplementation of Discovery
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Current concern with the prohibitive cost of discovery in both
complex 96 and uncomplicated 97 litigation sustains the Advisory
Committee's concern with expanding discovery requirements.
Discovery abuses based upon surprise should not be replaced by
discovery amendments generating more problems than they
solve. The required recanvassing of new information to comply
with even the limited burdens of supplementation has its most
profound effects in the largest and smallest cases. Federal liti-
gants in complex cases must seasonably evaluate numerous
scraps of information to determine their bearing upon prior dis-
covery responses and to avoid exclusion of newly acquired evi-
dence. This generates more costs and fees than supplementation
by responding to additional interrogatories. If the complex case
experience with federal supplementation confirms this possibility,
related litigation costs will confirm public98 and international 99
distrust of United States discovery procedures. In small cases,
sonably to supplement his answer with respect to any question directly
addressed to the identity and location of persons having knowledge of dis-
coverable matters and the identity and stated subject matter of each per-
son who will be called as an expert witness at trial. Supplemental
interrogatories may be filed in order to bring up to date the answers to
particular interrogatories, and the Court may make appropriate provisions
with respect thereto in a pre-trial order.
Id. at 5. See also FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(e), note 8 supra.
96. See generally authorities cited notes 11-14 supra.
97. Selected California courts are engaged in a pilot project that prohibits dis-
covery and substantially limits pretrial motions in specified cases when the
amount in controversy is less than $25,000. CAL. CIrv. PRoc. CODE §§ 1823-1833.2
(West Supp. 1979). A primary goal of the project is to eliminate the cost of discov-
ery in the so-called small cases. Ultimate use or expansion of this project would
extinguish the burdens associated with continuing discovery in those cases in
which discovery is prohibited or limited because of cost and fee considerations.
See Goebel, Policy for the Conduct of Proceedings Relating to Cases Filed and
Heard in Economical Litigation Project, Los Angeles Daily Journal, May 4, 1979, at
4 (Report Supp. 79-9); Economical Litigation Committee of the Los Angeles Mu-
nicipal Court, The ABCs of ELP, Los Angeles Daily Journal, May 4,1979, at 10 (Re-
port Supp. 79-9).
98. The President of the American Bar Association recently stated that the av-
erage person cannot afford the cost of litigation and is being deprived of access to
the legal system. The legal profession must therefore curb rising costs and in-
creasing delays-for example, new trial for failure to supplement-to eliminate
public mistrust Janofsky Says Litigation Cost Delay Causes Public Mistrust, Los
Angeles Daily Journal, May 9, 1979, at 1, cols. 5-6.
99. Nations including England, Canada, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, in
direct response to U.S. discovery procedures, prohibit extraterritorial removal of
certain documents. Speech by Lord Hacking, Member, House of Lords of the
United Kingdom, before the Los Angeles County Bar Association (June 27, 1978),
reprinted in The Increasing Extraterritorial Impact of U.S. Laws: A Cause for
Concern Among Friends of America, Los Angeles Daily Journal, Oct. 20, 1978, at
16-21 (Report Supp. 78-20). Cf. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industri-
elles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (refusal to answer inter-
the burdens of continuing discovery may be counterproductive to
desired reduction of discovery costs and attorneys' fees.100
The continuing discovery proposal had little effect upon the ex-
isting federal split of authority'0 1 regarding the scope of supple-
mentation. Federal opinions vacillated among the alternatives of
a continuing duty as to all interrogatories,102 effective 03 or ex-
plicit 0 4 inapplicability of a continuing duty in federal civil proce-
dure, or a limited continuing duty predicated upon particular
rogatories because compliance with U.S. discovery requirements would result in
Swiss criminal penalties).
100. See note 97 supra.
101. See notes 84-86 supra.
102. Montecatini Edison v. Rexall Drug and Chem. Co., 288 F. Supp. 486 (D. Del.
1968). As stated by the court- "[I]f future discovery or study were to alter the
plaintiff's position the Court would expect the plaintiff, in accordance with his con-
tinuing obligation to keep the answers to all interrogatories as up to date as possi-
ble, to amend his answer to Interrogatory 42." Id. at 491 (emphasis added). This
broad position was a surprise, in view of authority in the leading case from within
the Third Circuit which recognized a continuing duty only as to certain categories
of information. See Novick v. Pennsylvania R.R., 18 F.R.D. 296 (W.D. Pa. 1955),
wherein the court stated:
It is only in those circumstances where the very nature of the interro-
gatory should require continuing answers, or where the information ob-
tainable at pre-trial would not afford the party sufficient time and
opportunity to prepare his case, that the court should treat an interro-
gatory as "continuing." Otherwise, parties may be burdened with the re-
quirement of providing a myriad of scraps of information which could
prove of little aid to either party.
Id. at 298. The same Delaware Federal District Court, in partial reliance upon
Novick, had previously characterized only one of a number of interrogatories as
continuing in nature. Lunn v. United Aircraft Corp., 25 F.R.D. 186, 190 (D. Del.
1960).
103. See Washington Hosp. Center v. Cheeks, 394 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The
trial court permitted appellee to call an expert witness during trial although he
had not been identified previously as required by court order. The appellate court,
reasoning that this witness was actually deposed during trial, nevertheless af-
firmed the effective lack of a continuing duty imposed by court order in its deter-
mination: "The District Judge must, of course, have broad discretion [to permit
the witness to testify] since he is in a far better position to evaluate the situation
than are we." Id. at 965. The Court cited a Fifth Circuit case which also affirmed
admissibility of expert testimony notwithstanding violation of a pretrial confer-
ence order. Id. at 966 (citing Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Buckles, 232 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 984 (1956)).
104. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. King, 45 F.R.D. 521 (W.D. Okla. 1968). As
stated by the court: "It is the Court's opinion that to allow continuing interrogato-
ries will impose an intolerable burden on the Court's administration of judicial
business.... The Court, therefore, takes the view that continuing interrogatories
will not be permitted." Id. at 522. The court dealt with what it deemed to be a
case of first impression, based upon no consideration of the continuing interro-
gatory question in regard to surprise witnesses. Id. However, in an analogous sit-
uation, exhibits and witnesses were not permitted because of failure to identify
them in response to a pretrial order, which was affirmed because "the order was
not complied with by giving notice of a desire to use additional exhibits and wit-
ness [es]." Globe Cereal Mills v. Scrivener, 240 F.2d 330, 335 (10th Cir. 1956).
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circumstances. 0 5 The interim decisionsl o6 citing proposed Rule
26(e) prior to its effective date specifically noted the inherent lack
of unanimity in federal law spawned by the always competing
benefits and burdens of supplementation. 0 7
The federal supplementation rule was designed to encourage
litigants to adjust to a narrow rule. The original proposal 08 was
substantively expanded to more thoroughly limit the overall
scope of the continuing discovery concept. 0 9 The early commen-
tators gave speculative approval to this discovery amendment." 0
It was designed to resolve more ambiguities than it created. How-
ever, the adversarial nature of litigation has fostered problems of
105. As stated in an Eighth Circuit opinion:
We think, within the context of this case, the plaintiff could be held to be
under a continuing obligation to provide the defendant with all of her hos-
pital records subsequent to her injury, which were relevant to the issues
of the case up to the date of trial. However, we hesitate at this time to
formulate any general rule covering this problem....
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Miller, 402 F.2d 134, 143 (8th Cir. 1968). The court was ob-
viously hesitant to formulate a general rule, although it quoted the 1967 Advisory
Committee's continuing duty proposal. Id. at 145.
106. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Miller, 402 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1968); Fernandes v.
United Fruit Co., 50 F.R.D. 82, 83 (D. Md. 1970).
107. See, e.g., Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Miller, 402 F.2d 134, 142-43 (8th Cir. 1968)
(citing conflicting federal decisions as to existence or scope of a continuing duty);
Fernandes v. United Fruit Co., 50 F.R.D. 82, 83 (D. Md. 1970) (citing conflict be-
tween federal and state decisions in Maryland, as well as expansion of district
court's scope of continuing duty from earlier decision because of anticipated adop-
tion of uniform federal rule).
108. Rule 26(e), as originally proposed, read as follows:
A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a response that
was complete when made is under no duty to supplement his response to
include information thereafter acquired, except as follows:
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with
respect to any question directly addressed to (A) the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity
of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial and the
subject matter on which he is expected to testify.
(2) A party who knows or later learns that his response is incorrect is
under a duty seasonably to correct the response.
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the
court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through re-
quests for supplementation of prior responses.
1967 PRELIMINARY DRAFr, supra note 26, at 228.
109. Paragraph two imposes no continuing duty as to responses correct when
tendered but later alleged to be incorrect because of failure to supplement, where
knowing concealment cannot be proven.
110. Cooper, Work Product of the Rulesmakers, 53 MmI. L. REV. 1269, 1304
(1969); Note, Proposed 1967 Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 271, 296 (1968).
construction which were inconceivable when Rule 26(e) was
promulgated in 1970.
IrM. CURRENT CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS
Rule 26(e) was intentionally and explicitly cast in the nega-
tive: 1 ' "A party who has responded to a request for discovery
with a response that was complete when made is under no duty
to supplement his response to include information thereafter ac-
quired... ,"112 The Advisory Committee Note is not very explicit
regarding its reasons for drafting the rule in this manner." 3 It is
implicit that caution, manifested by a limited duty under certain
exceptions, would be superior to the reckless abandon evidenced
by an unlimited duty." 4
This no-duty rule, not subject to expansion by preamble or local
rule," 5 is qualified by the following seven exceptions:
(a) Persons having knowledge of discoverable matter;
(b) Expert witnesses;
(c) Responses known to be incorrect when made;
(d) Responses correct when made but subsequently known to
be incorrect;
(e) Duty to supplement imposed by court order;
(f) Duty to supplement agreed to by parties;
(g) New discovery requests for supplementation of prior re-
sponses. 116
111. The Advisory Committee cited law review commentary lamenting the
prejudice inherent in failing to advise an adversary prior to trial (1) when known
witnesses were intentionally undisclosed and (2) when a new witness was discov-
ered but undisclosed. The cases had found no duty in the latter situation in the
absence of an express duty. The commentators disagreed. See 1970 AMENDMENTS,
supra note 27, at 508 (citing Note, Discovery Practice in States Adopting the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 HARv. L. REV. 673, 677 (1955).
112. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(e) (emphasis added).
113. See 1970 AMENDMENTS, supra note 27, at 507-08.
114. See text accompanying notes 92-100 supra.
115. See Fernandes v. United Fruit Co., 50 F.R.D. 82, 83 (D. Md. 1970) (only fed-
eral case limiting scope of federal supplementation, contrary to general state ap-
proach, to scope of the duty contained in Rule 26(e) prior to adoption). A
difference between federal and state practice regarding continuing discovery, if
within the zone of Erie and its progeny, is not herein analyzed. For a discussion of
related problems, see Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act. In
Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 Hnv. L REV. 356 (1977). As stated by the
Advisory Committee: "Subdivision (e) provides that a party is not under a contin-
uing duty except as expressly provided." 1970 AMENDMENTS, supra note 27, at 508
(emphasis added). A diversity court would probably apply Rule 26(e), rather than
a conflicting state rule pursuant to Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (Rules En-
abling Act, not Rules of Decision Act, controls direct conflicts between state and
federal procedure).
116. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(e).
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These exceptions are herein analyzed under the broad categories
of witnesses, incorrect responses, and elastic supplementation.
A. Witnesses
A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with re-
spect to any question directly addressed to (A) the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity
of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, and the




Rule 26(e) requires timely amendment in order to promote effi-
ciency and prevent the abuse which existed prior to its adoption.
The rule does not expressly require "seasonable" supplementa-
tion as to a duty imposed by court or party agreement," 8 al-
though this is expressly required as to witnesses and incorrect
responses." 9 Seasonable supplementation should be implied
throughout Rule 26(e) as its legislative intent is premised upon
providing adequate reaction time to the interrogating party. 2 0
The trial court's inherent power to control discovery abuse may
now fill this gap.121 However, a contrary argument can be drawn
from the legislative comment that there are no duties except as
expressly provided.122 This ambiguity could be resolved by recog-
nition of the need for an express sanction applicable to Rule
117. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(e) (1). Although there are distinctions between "persons
having knowledge of discoverable matters," "lay" witnesses, and "percipient" wit-
nesses, these terms are herein utilized interchangeably unless otherwise indi-
cated.
118. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(e) (court order, party agreement, and new requests for
supplementation).
119. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e) (1) (witnesses), (2) (incorrect responses).
120. The Advisory Committee guidelines were expanded by one paragraph:
"The duty will normally be enforced, in those limited instances where it is im-
posed, through sanctions imposed by the trial court, including exclusion of evi-
dence, continuance, or other action, as the court may deem appropriate." 1970
AMENDMENTs, supra note 27, at 508, Advisory Committee Note. But cf 1967 PRE-
LI NmARY DRAFr, supra note 26, at 238 (quoted paragraph not included in original
Advisory Committee Note).
121. Id. See also National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc.,
427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976) (per curiam) (Supreme Court reiteration that appropriate
review standard for trial court choice of discovery sanctions is whether discretion
was abused); S. Kann's Sons Corp. v. Hayes, 320 A.2d 593, 596 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974)
(wide discretion to impose sanctions for failure to completely and accurately an-
swer pretrial interrogatories as to photographs, relying upon federal procedure).
122. For Advisory Committee comment, see note 115 supra.
26(e).123
The seasonable amendment requirement is not limited to party
responses.124 A party may produce an independent witness 125
whose deposition testimony does not disclose matter to be relied
upon at trial. The party controlling such a deponent126 should
seasonably disclose any additional bases for the deposition testi-
mony, assuming that all bases are sought by the interrogating
party at the deposition. Seasonable amendment is required if the
circumstances are such that surprise would result from conceal-
ment by the controlling party. No such concealment would be
found if the deposing party does not properly discover the case
because of failure to inquire regarding all bases for claims or de-
fenses while taking a deposition. The limited federal supplemen-
tation duty does not make a volunteer of the responding party.
There is no duty to read into discovery questions anything that is
not asked.127
Judicial opinion of what constitutes seasonable supplementa-
tion recently shifted from an emphasis upon specific events to an
earliest opportunity approach. Untimely disclosure of new issues
has resulted in the uniform exclusion of matter sought to be in-
123. An amendment expanding Rule 37 to govern all discovery violations was
proposed but rejected without comment. Compare 1978 PREL T NARY DRAFT,
supra note 5, at 652-53, with 1979 REVISED PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 5, at
344-48. Otherwise, the word "seasonably" could be inserted in paragraph three of
Rule 26(e) to ensure uniformity in interpretation of each of the rule's subdivisions.
Reported decisions involving Rule 26(e)(3) have implied this requirement. See,
e.g., Tabatchnick v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 F.R.D. 49 (D.N.J. 1975). "Whatever else
that term [as soon as feasible] means, it implies a time long enough before trial to
permit a fair opportunity to prepare for trial." Id. at 55 (court-ordered require-
ment of informative disclosure as soon as feasible).
124. See, e.g., Barnes v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc., 211 Kan. 315,
321, 507 P.2d 288, 294 (1973) (affirmed trial court exercise of discretion excluding a
basis for nonparty testimony at trial not timely disclosed after deposition, relying
upon federal procedure).
125. Testimony of any person, not a party to the action, by deposition upon oral
examination. See FED. R. Crv. P. 30(a), construed in Less v. Taber Instrument
Corp., 53 F.R.D. 645, 647 (W.D.N.Y. 1971).
126. As stated in an illustrative state decision construing Kansas' Rule 226(e):
"We believe that Dr. Reals [defendant hospital's staff physician] should seasona-
bly have amended his deposition by disclosing that he had examined the patholog-
ical slides in forming his opinion, in addition to the documents mentioned in his
deposition." Barnes v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc., 211 Kan. 315,
321, 507 P.2d 288, 294 (1973) (relying upon federal authority in support of quoted
statement). A prima facie case of control of a nonparty is all that need be estab-
lished to justify a party to undertake appropriate discovery measures. See Nor-
man v. Young, 422 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1970); Hart v. Wolff, 489 P.2d 114 (Alaska
1971).
127. See Dudley v. South Jersey Metal, Inc., 555 F.2d 96, 99-100 (3d Cir. 1977)
(ambiguous deposition question generating response that manufacturer did not
make injury-producing bracket although it finalized product after receipt and in-
corporation of third party's bracket not answered in violation of Rule 26(e)).
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troduced after the close of discovery,128 just prior to trial,129 and
subsequent to impaneling of the jury. 30 Supplementation at
these stages was not deemed seasonable since the continuing dis-
covery concept was necessitated by such surprise tactics. As was
stated succinctly in an opinion dealing with the critical impact of
surprise expert testimony:
The subjective explanation for the default is irrelevant. It makes no differ-
ence whether it was due to failure to prepare for trial or due to an inten-
tional purpose to gain the benefit of surprise. The [continuing burden]
rule bars the result without regard to cause, except for those beyond con-
trol.1 3
1
This approach paralleled the introduction of the 1975 Federal
Rules of Evidence, 3 2 the 1970 amendment regarding experts in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 3 3 and the venerable theory
of the Model Expert Testimony Act.' 3 4
The early decisions focused upon specific events, 3 5 which trig-
gered exclusion of unseasonable supplementation. Current opin-
ions evidence a more demanding approach, 3 6 whereby
128. As stated in a relevant decision: "The defendant had two and one-half
months from the time it got the new information from Polite until the final closing
of discovery, and waited another five or six weeks after that before filing the sup-
plemental answers. This was clearly not acting seasonably." Havenfield Corp. v.
H. & R. Block, Inc., 509 F.2d 1263, 1272 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975)
(exclusion of medical records within trial court discretion).
129. As stated in a relevant decision: "[T]here was virtually no way for Mara-
thon to prepare adequately to respond to the testimony of the surprise witnesses.
Unfair surprise of this sort is contrary to the policy of the federal rules, which
sanction extensive discovery." Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 528 F.2d 395, 404 (6th
Cir. 1975) (no credible support for contention party discovered witnesses three
days prior to trial as reasonable diligence would have resulted in earlier disclo-
sure).
130. Tabatchnick v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 F.RD. 49 (D.N.J. 1975) (postimpanel-
ling of jury supplementation regarding new expert witness not reasonable, result-
ing in exclusion of testimony).
131. Id. at 55.
132. See 65 F.R.D. 131 (1975) (effective July 1, 1975).
133. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (4) (new provisions dealing with discovery of informa-
tion obtained from expert but not yet transmitted to adversary). See generally
1970 AmENDMENTs, supra note 27, at 494 (proposed rule), 503 (note).
134. As provided in the Act: "Unless otherwise authorized by the court, no
party shall call a witness, who has not been appointed by the court, to give expert
testimony unless that party has given the court and the adverse party to the pro-
ceeding reasonable notice of the expert to be called." MODEL EXPERT TESTIMONY
ACT § 3 (1937) (withdrawn).
135. See text accompanying notes 128-30 supra (involving the "early" decisions
of 1975).
136. More rigid adherence to the philosophy of mutual exchange of all relevant
information is a likely result of the U.S. Supreme Court's recently expressed dis-
approval of traditional judicial leniency regarding discovery abuses. Compare
supplementation would be characterized as unseasonable if not
tendered at the earliest opportunity. In a recent water pollution
case brought by the federal government, interrogatories filed in
1972 requested that the defendant list all studies it had under-
taken dealing with alternative methods of pollution control and
discharge.137 Additional studies were identified in the defendant's
supplemental responses, but only after the plaintiff's discovery of
their existence from other sources. This apparent compliance
was not deemed to be meaningful compliance with Rule 26(e) be-
cause of the requirement of timely supplementation.138
In a 1978 contract case, the first federal decision to impose a dis-
missal sanction on the basis of Rule 26(e), the defendant failed to
comply with a court order requiring submission of an expert wit-
ness list.13 9 Its counterclaim was dismissed because this category
of discovery information was so "vital that proper responses to in-
terrogatories asking for information concerning experts [must] be
afforded at the earliest opportunity."140 Otherwise, an unaccept-
able lengthening of trial would be necessary because of surprise
that would necessitate depositions and related discovery during
trial. A rather strict standard is therefore emerging regarding
"seasonable" supplementation of responses as to witnesses, in-
correct responses, and court-ordered continuing discovery.
2. Questions Directly Addressed to Witness Information
A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with re-
spect to any question directly addressed to (A)... persons having knowl-
edge of discoverable matters and (B) ... an expert witness at trial.14 1
The duty to supplement is further limited by the "direct ques-
tion" requirement. The propounding party must directly address
his discovery to percipient and expert witness information if he
intends to trigger the responding party's duty to supplement.
Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962) (limited purpose of dismissal sanction to
penalize the recalcitrant litigant), with National Hockey League v. Metropolitan
Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiam) (additional purpose of dismis-
sal sanction to deter other litigants failing to timely comply with discovery obliga-
tions).
One commentator's test is that supplementation must be made in sufficient time
to allow the opponent to take whatever responsive action is necessary to properly
prepare for trial. Clough, Rxfor Defense-Aggressive Use of the Amended Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 38 INS. COUNSEL J. 354, 355 (1971).
137. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 412 F. Supp. 705, 710 (D. Minn.), affid,
543 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976).
138. Id.
139. Laclede Gas Co. v. G.W. Warnecke Corp., 78 F.R.D. 502 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (vi-
olation of court order triggering applicability of referenced sanction under Rule
37), aff'd, 604 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1979).
140. Id. at 504.
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1) (emphasis added).
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Litigants cannot depend upon the rule's surprise-avoidance
function if their discovery has not been addressed directly to the
witness information governed by it. Where a party initially ob-
tains the names of opposition experts and opinions pursuant to
Rule 26(b) (4),142 the opponent's failure to fully supplement under
Rule 26(e) will ordinarily result in unfair prejudice because of the
reliance interest generated by the latter rule.143 Experts cannot
be permitted to testify when the opposing party, unable to estab-
lish their potential relationship with the jury, has not been pro-
vided a seasonable opportunity to assess their impact upon the
lawsuit.144 There is no general duty to read into discovery ques-
tions anything that is not asked.145 Litigants may not otherwise
avoid the duty to update obsolete responses directed to persons
having knowledge of discoverable matter under Rule 26(b) (1)146
and experts under Rule 26(b) (4).147
142. The general scope of expert witness discovery is:
A party may through interrogatories require the other party to identify
each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at
trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify,
and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is
expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion....
[T] he court may order further discovery by other means, subject to such
restrictions as to scope and such provisions... concerning fees and ex-
penses as the court may deem appropriate.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (4) (A) (i), (ii).
143. Full supplementation would not be appropriate if witnesses identified after
original discovery responses are not useful to any party. This would occur when,
for example, the new witness could testify only upon matters no longer in issue.
144. Voegeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89, 97 (8th Cir. 1977) (reversal of trial court's
gross abuse of discretion in permitting unidentified expert to testify in violation of
Rule 26(e)); Tabatchnick v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 F.R.D. 49, 53 (D.N.J. 1975) (expert
testimony excluded since three-year-old interrogatory regarding experts not
timely supplemented).
145. See Dudley v. South Jersey Metal, Inc., 555 F.2d 96, 99-100 (3d Cir. 1977)
(abuse of discretion in refusal to permit evidence that party did not set out to mis-
lead adversary by failing to amend response to interrogatory).
146. The general scope of nonexpert witness discovery is:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it
relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the
claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge
of any discoverable matter.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1).
147. See note 142 supra.
3. Persons Having Knowledge of Discoverable Matters
A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with re-
spect to any question directly addressed to (A) the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters .... 148
The dearth of cases involving this portion of Rule 26(e) sug-
gests that problems construing it result from unseasonable com-
pliance rather than from any drafting defect. But judicial
application has not been uniform.149 For example, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed trial court discretion per-
mitting testimony of witnesses provided during trial.150 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed trial court discretion excluding testimony
of witnesses provided three days prior to trial.151 In both cases,
unexpected lay witnesses were identified at the eleventh hour,
Rule 26(e) was applicable, and trial court discretion was not dis-
turbed.152 In Eisbach v. Jo-Carroll Electric Cooperative, the Sev-
enth Circuit acquiesced in the receipt of such testimony,
notwithstanding the recently adopted continuing discovery rule
that was applicable. 53 Ironically, it relied on its own precedent
148. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(e) (1) (A) (emphasis added). Professor Wright refers to
this category of witnesses as "occurrence witness," thereby distinguishing be-
tween witnesses to the occurrences and witnesses who will testify at trial. C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 81, at 401 (3d ed. 1976). The
terms "lay" and "percipient" witness are herein used interchangeably.
149. EEOC v. Carter Carburetor, 577 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 865 (1979) (mandamus withdrawing establishment-preclusion order regarding
certain unidentified trial witnesses); Sadowski v. Bombardier Ltd., 539 F.2d 615
(7th Cir. 1976) (discretion determinative of whether listed lay witnesses are also
expert witnesses); Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 528 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1975) (exclu-
sion of witnesses identified three days prior to trial); Eisbach v. Jo-Carroll Elec.
Coop., 440 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1971) (trial witness list provided to adversary on first
day of trial approved).
State decisions dealing with the surprise witness problem, subsequent to adop-
tion of Rule 26(e), are reported in Hollins v. Sneed, 300 A.2d 447 (D.C. Ct. App.
1973) (discretion not abused in permitting witness testimony where potential wit-
ness unknown until just prior to trial); In re Estate of Weber, 97 Idaho 703, 551
P.2d 1339 (1976) (1975 amendment adding Rule 26(e) not retroactively applicable
to action commenced in 1974); Everett v. Morrison, 478 S.W.2d 312 (Mo. 1972) (un-
successful argument that continuing discovery ceases moment trial commences);
Laney v. Hefley, 262 S.C. 54, 202 S.E.2d 12 (1974) (unidentified witness permitted to
testify, notwithstanding continuing burden under local rule, as prejudice not
strong).
Approval of permitting testimony of undisclosed witnesses has been based
largely upon the opposing party's independent knowledge of their existence. See,
e.g., Sadowski v. Bombardier Ltd., 539 F.2d 615, 617 n.1 (7th Cir. 1976); Buckler v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 68 Ill. App. 2d 283, 216 N.E.2d 14 (1966); Wolfe v. Northern
Pac. Ry., 147 Mont. 29, 409 P.2d 528 (1966).
150. Eisbach v. Jo-Carroll Elec. Coop., 440 F.2d 1171, 1173 (7th Cir. 1971).
151. Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 528 F.2d 395, 397 (6th Cir. 1975).
152. Compare Eisbach v. Jo-Carroll Elec. Coop., 440 F.2d 1171, 1173 (7th Cir.
1971), with Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 528 F.2d 395, 397 (6th Cir. 1975).
153. It appears that this case was filed prior to July 1, 1970, the effective date of
Rule 26(e).
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excluding such testimony. 5 4 The court concluded without sup-
portive commentary: "Nevertheless, since the [witness] list was
eventually furnished to plaintiffs on the first trial day, the district
judge was entitled to permit defendants' witnesses to testify."155
The decisional authority cited for this statement 5 6 predated the
existence of Rule 26(e) by five years and is factually distinguisha-
ble because the identity of the alleged surprise witness was
known to the opponent "long before the date of [the] trial."'15
A recent case warned that a moving party, who is in pari delicto
in creating the discovery problem, should not expect the benefits
of Rule 26(e). In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Carter Carburetor,'5 8 the plaintiff Commission supplemented its
answers to the defendant employer's interrogatories seeking the
identity of discriminatees. However, the EEOC did so using the
all too familiar statement that it was unable to identify other indi-
viduals until it had completed its discovery, but that it would, in
accordance with Rule 26(e), supplement responses to the defend-
ant's second set of interrogatories.159 The trial court, relying upon
the Supreme Court's disdain for leniency in imposing sanctions
for discovery abuse expressed in National Hockey League v. Met-
ropolitan Hockey Club,160 had characterized the EEOC's repeated
refusal to answer critical witness interrogatories as "indefen-
sible."161 After reviewing the conduct of the interrogating party
defendant that had successfully moved for sanctions, the Eighth
Circuit reversed the decision in this "classic case of [dual] abuse
of the discovery process."'162 Carter Carburetor admonishes fu-
ture litigants that sanctions involving Rule 26(e) violations may
154. Eisbach v. Jo-Carroll Elec. Coop., 440 F.2d 1171, 1173 (7th Cir. 1971) (relying
upon Fisher v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 115 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1940)). Fisher in-
volved a plaintiff who declined to answer interrogatories and was precluded from
offering proof thereon at trial.
155. Eisbach v. Jo-Carroll Elec. Coop., 440 F.2d 1171, 1173 (7th Cir. 1971).
156. Stewart v. Meyers, 353 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1965).
157. Id. at 696.
158. 577 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 865 (1979).
159. Id. at 48.
160. 427 U.S. 639 (1976).
161. EEOC v. Carter Carburetor, 76 F.R.D. 143, 144 (E.D. Mo. 1977), rev'd, 577
F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 865 (1979).
162. EEOC v. Carter Carburetor, 577 F.2d at 49 (mandamus ordering with-
drawal of sanctions which had been levied against plaintiff EEOC, the interro-
gated party under a duty to supplement its witness list), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 865
(1979).
be withheld when the "aggrieved" party contributes to the alleged
discovery abuse.
A final problem involving supplementation of lay witnesses in-
terlocks with supplementation of expert witnesses. The case of
Sadowski v. Bombardier Ltd.163 involved the familiar scenario
where both parties were at fault regarding discovery obligations,
resulting in denial of the relief requested. The defendant ob-
jected to the plaintiff's listing of some percipient witnesses who
then testified as alleged experts at trial.164 At issue in the case
was whether the plaintiff's snowmobile accident had resulted
from the plaintiff's loss of control, as the defense contended, or
from a broken defective part. The two witnesses, snowmobile
dealers, were directly examined on the issue of typical reasons
for loss of control. Although they testified on highly technical
matters, they were not deemed experts in view of the nonexpert
nature of their testimony.165 The objecting defendant was also at
fault for tardily furnishing its witness list.
The trial court in Sadowski permitted the plaintiff's witnesses
to testify in the interest of justice, rationalizing that:
[P]laintiff's counsel were skating very close to the line dividing expert
from lay testimony, and we think that total candor might have required
them to indicate that [these witnesses] did have some expert ability.
However, the two witnesses were listed in the pretrial report. Nor does
the record support a conclusion that there was a knowing concealment
such as is prohibited by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e). 166
If the referenced witnesses had been characterized as undis-
closed experts, the result would not have differed necessarily as
trial courts now enjoy great latitude in the conduct of pretrial
matters.167 However, a pervasive approach can be deduced from
this supplementation problem. Rule 26 requires supplementation
of responses regarding the identity of trial experts, the subject
matter on which they will testify, and the substance of their testi-
mony.168 It aids in carrying out the pretrial exchange of critical
expert testimony under Rule 26(b) and will not be readily
avoided by the less-than-candid compliance permitted in Sadow-
ski. As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in National
Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club169 five weeks after
163. 539 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1976).
164. Id. at 617-18.
165. Id. at 620.
166. Id.
167. 1970 AMENDMENTS, supra note 27, at 508. But cf. Rosenberg, Appellate Re-
view of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173, 184 (1979) (too much discretion in too
many areas afforded to trial courts).
168. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (4), (e) (1) (B).
169. 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiam).
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Sadowski, future trial use of witnesses not clearly identified as
experts is not likely to be tolerated.
4. Experts: The Critical Category
A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with re-
spect to any question directly addressed to... the identity of each person
expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on
which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his testimony. 17 0
A federal court litigant cannot force disclosure of lay witnesses
that his adversary intends to call as trial witnesses,171 except as
permitted by pretrial procedure. 7 2 Expert witnesses are treated
far differently. The pivotal nature of expert testimony 3 renders
its subject matter and substance both discoverable and subject to
continuing supplementation in the event of any change in listed
experts. It is submitted that deletion of a listed expert is also
subject to supplementation requirements. This is premised upon
the opponent's justified reliance upon anticipated retention and
utilization of all listed experts at trial. This results in unneces-
sary pretrial preparation for cross-examination and rebuttal testi-
mony. Sanctions controlling this abuse would serve to further
implement the stated goal of avoiding unfair surprise.
Litigation involving supplementation of federal discovery re-
sponses often focuses upon the expert trial witness whose testi-
mony tends to have the greatest effect upon the trier of fact. 74
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e) (1) (B). Most of the recent supplementation decisions
involve the expert trial witness.
171. Witnesses intended to be called for nonexpert trial testimony were not dis-
coverable either prior to, or subsequent to, the 1970 adoption of continuing discov-
ery. See, e.g., Brennan v. Engineered Prod., Inc., 506 F.2d 299, 303 n.2 (8th Cir.
1974); Wirtz v. Continental Fin. & Loan Co., 326 F.2d 561, 564 (5th Cir. 1964).
172. See Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546, 550 (2d Cir. 1961) (order pre-
cluding witness testimony, removing all basis for proof of claim, improperly at
odds with intent and purpose of federal rules).
173. Persons utilized for consultation purposes because of their particular field
of expertise, but not intended to be called at trial to testify as experts, are discov-
erable only upon a showing of good cause under exceptional circumstances. FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b) (4) (B). Federal decisions are split regarding discoverability of the
consultant's identity. See Sea Colony, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 63 F.RD. 113
(D. Del. 1974) (opponent not required to demonstrate exceptional circumstances
to discover identity of expert-consultant not intended to testify). Contra, Perry v.
W.S. Darley & Co., 54 F.R.D. 278 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (motion for order compelling dis-
closure of "experts" denied where no showing of adversary's intent to call expert-
consultant as trial witness).
174. An analysis of the critical nature of this type of testimony is contained in
Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14
STAN. L. REV. 455 (1962).
The major problems involve where to place the burden of proving
prejudice and whether Rule 26(e) is subject to strict or liberal
construction.
Nutt v. Black Hills Stage Lines, Inc.175 was the first case de-
cided under Rule 26(e) that dealt with expert witness supplemen-
tation.176 The Nutt decision evidenced latent resistance to the
logic of supplementation. This reaction was confirmed by the trial
court's opinion and the dissent at the appellate level. The plaintiff
in the case failed to notify the defendant of the identity of a
neuropsychiatrist who had examined the plaintiff on the day prior
to the trial, for the purpose of testifying at trial. The defendant's
motion for a continuance, predicated upon surprise and lack of
opportunity to conduct discovery, was denied. The court opted
for placing a burden upon the unsuspecting defendant who was
expected to locate an expert rebuttal psychiatrist to examine the
plaintiff on the very evening that the plaintiff's surprise expert
was identified during voir dire.177
On appeal, the Nutt decision was reversed. The majority could
not acquiesce in leaving the burden of proving prejudice with the
innocent party. The surprise-avoidance objective of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the state court rules prohibiting one
from profiting from one's own wrong would be otherwise of-
fended.178 The Nutt court implemented these objectives by plac-
ing the burden of proving lack of prejudice squarely upon the
175. 452 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1971).
176. The record refers to "[ajppellee's medical witness, who examined appellee
for the sole purpose of qualifying himself to testify as an expert at trial." Id. at
481. However, the record could be construed as involving a treating physician to
be utilized as a percipient witness or in the dual capacity of treating physician and
expert medical witness. See id. at 481-83.
177. Id. at 482. More recent federal decisions recognize the possibility of such a
rapid reaction balanced with the objective of surprise avoidance.
Of course, it may well be possible in many cases for able counsel on an
overnight basis to prepare and defend against last-minute claims by his
adversary. Certainly, that sort of emergency litigation which could degen-
erate into "quick-draw hip-shooting" is precisely what the discovery rules
were designed to prevent. Under a holding approving the initial presenta-
tion of a principal claim and theory of recovery at the eleventh hour, as we
find in this case, the discovery rules would serve no inducement to a can-
did and orderly revelation of the claims, defenses, and facts upon which
the issues would ultimately be presented. To be sure, the defendant was
well aware of the fact that the plaintiff had suffered a heart attack, but
there was no forewarning that the heart attack would serve as the founda-
tion for one of the key issues at trial. The question the defendant had
properly propounded by interrogatory to the plaintiff was designed to de-
termine whether or not the plaintiff was proceeding in court under a claim
that the heart attack was caused by the broken step incident.
Shelak v. White Motor Co., 581 F.2d 1155, 1159 (5th Cir. 1978) (interests of justice
and judicial economy best served by reversal and remand solely on issue of dam-
ages).
178. See Nutt v. Black Hills Stage Lines, Inc., 452 F.2d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 1971).
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party who failed to supplement.179 Because expert testimony is of
a more critical nature than other information subject to continu-
ing discovery, the interrogated party should always bear this bur-
den in order to eliminate surprise.180
Of all the federal decisions dealing with surprise generated by
inadequate supplementation of experts, Tabatchnick v. G.D.
Searle & Co.' 8 ' most clearly signals patent adherence to the logic
of supplementation. During trial, the plaintiff unsuccessfully at-
tempted to call an undisclosed expert without good cause.18 2 The
expert's testimony was the necessary foundation for further testi-
mony by a disclosed expert. The apparent necessity for such
foundational testimony three years prior to trial resulted in the
exclusion of this foundational testimony. 8 3 The court harshly ad-
monished any litigator who planned to violate Rule 26(e): "The
bar allowed to practice before the federal court here is put on no-
tice by this ruling [excluding undisclosed expert's testimony]
that cases must be prepared for trial, and that the consequences
179. The Nutt majority describes this situation as occurring without the fault of
either party. Id. at 483. It seems, however, that if both parties were "innocent,"
then the defendant was far more innocent than the plaintiff who should have
borne the consequences in such a situation. The dissent resumed-
I do not believe it is entirely accurate to say that "Dr. Natarajan's testi-
mony added a significant new dimension to appellee's case." Plaintiff's
answers to defendants' interrogatories and reports of her Scottish physi-
cians were available to defendants' attorneys long before the trial. Al-
though these documents did not assert a claim of traumatic neuroses in
those precise words, they plainly described her condition in terms which
defendants' experienced and competent attorneys should have recognized
as symptomatic of that affliction.
Id. at 484 (Matthes, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). This was premised upon
the usual wide latitude of discretion accorded to trial court control of the judicial
process.
180. As stated by the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 26(e), specifically in-
corporating Rule 26(b) (4) as to experts: "A party is not under a continuing bur-
den except as expressly provided ... An exception is also made as to expert trial
,witnesses in order to carry out the provisions of Rule 26(b) (4)." 1970 AMEND-
mENrs, supra note 27, at 508 (emphasis added). But see Dychalo v. Copperloy
Corp., 78 F.R.D. 146, 148 (E.D. Pa.) (pretrial memorandum identifying possible ex-
pert's identity only sufficient to place opponent on notice of intended use of refer-
enced person as expert), affd sub nom. Copperloy Corp. v. Congoleum Indus.,
Inc., 588 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1978).
181. 67 F.RD. 49 (D.N.J. 1975) (notice of new experts regarding oral contracep-
tive claim against manufacturer not seasonable after jury impanelled).
182. Id. at 50-51.
183. The need for introducing one undisclosed expert's testimony in order to in-
troduce a disclosed expert's testimony should not result in putting an opponent on
constructive notice that an additional expert may testify. See text accompanying
notes 178-80 supra.
of failure to do so will fall on their own clients.' 84 Federal coun-
sel should anticipate that, with the limited exception of uncontrol-
lable cause such as death of an expert during trial, subjective
explanations for noncompliance will be deemed irrelevant.
The Tabatchnick court's rather strict interpretation of continu-
ing discovery has not been followed uniformly even within its
own circuit which pioneered development of pre-Rule 26(e) con-
tinuing discovery. 8 5 The comparatively liberal doctrine of "con-
structive compliance" recently surfaced in Dychalo v. Copperloy
Corp.'8 6 In Dychalo various post-verdict motions seeking to rec-
tify nondisclosure of an expert witness, a Mr. Sargeant, were de-
nied. 8 7 This expert's testimony was characterized as
nonprejudicial because it did not propound a novel theory.188
The court assumed that lack of a novel theory is equivalent to ad-
equate knowledge of the subject matter and substance of the dis-
closed expert's undisclosed testimony. The rationale was that Mr.
Sargeant's testimony was cumulative rather than decisive.189 Ad-
mittedly, commentators are not in a sound position to assess the
impact of such testimony upon the trial. Yet this rationale as-
sumes that failure to furnish the substance of Mr. Sargeant's tes-
timony did not result in unfair surprise at trial. The court
concluded that the burdened party had constructively complied
with the supplementation requirements of Rule 26(e) (1) (B).190
184. Tabatchnick v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 F.R.D. 49, 57 (D.N.J. 1975). But of.
Szilvassy v. United States, 71 F.R.D. 589, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), where the court, rec-
ognizing its authority to dismiss for counsel's repeated failure to comply with dis-
covery obligations, stated:
Since it is not clear to what extent, if any, plaintiff was at fault, and since
it is abundantly clear to what extent plaintiffs counsel is at fault (as de-
scribed above), the Court declines to dismiss the action, but will require
plaintiff's counsel (and not plaintiff) to pay the reasonable expenses of
this motion, including attorney's fees.
185. See text accompanying notes 46-52 supra.
186. 78 F.R.D. 146 (E.D. Pa.), afd sub nom. Copperloy Corp. v. Congoleum In-
dus., Inc., 588 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1978).
187. Trial court motions for new trial and vacation of judgment are the likely
procedural devices for reviewing supplementation problems, rather than interlocu-
tory appeal which requires the presence of a "controlling question of law," manda-
mus which requires "extraordinary circumstances," or appeal pursuant to the
collateral order doctrine which requires the presence of a "serious and unsettled
question." The impotence of the referenced appellate devices is evident from an
examination of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949) (col-
lateral order doctrine); Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947) (mandamus re-
quirements); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958) (interlocutory appeal).
188. Dychalo v. Copperloy Corp., 78 F.R.D. 146, 148-49 (E.D. Pa.), a~fd sub nom.
Copperloy Corp. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 588 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1978).
189. Id. at 149.
190. But the rule requires the interrogated party to tender the general subject
matter and specific substance of the expert's testimony in addition to identifying
the expert. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(e)(1)(B). See also FED. I. Cirv. P. 26(b)(4).
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The court pointed to the pretrial memorandum identifying Sar-
geant as a possible expert witness as evidence of sufficient com-
pliance to avoid substantial prejudice. Further evidence of
compliance was drawn from Sargeant's execution of the affidavit
to interrogatory answers.191 An abusive adversary could generate
excessive discovery costs merely by listing every possible or con-
ceivable expert trial witness, without providing the substance of
each witness' intended testimony.192 An active opponent would
want to depose all such experts, thereby bearing the costs of mu-
tual discovery.
Avoidance of surprise should not necessitate a per se rule im-
posing sanctions for every breach of Rule 26(e). But the fully
supported record of discovery abuse193 should necessitate utmost
judicial scrutiny when a constructive compliance argument is ten-
dered by the party burdened with a duty to supplement. Compli-
ance with Rule 26(e) is not complete and arguably not
"substantial" according to the Dychalo court because of its poten-
tial for abuse, particularly when mere identification of a listed ex-
pert is tendered without further providing the subject matter on
which he is expected to testify and the substance of his testi-
mony. An interrogated party should not be permitted to comply
partially by the mere listing of names without demonstrating why
his possible experts are the intended trial experts. Future cases
may require many assumptions, sometimes without regard for the
record, 9 4 to avoid the delay and cost of new trials. Stretching this
constructive compliance doctrine to judicially mitigate failure to
comply with continuing discovery requirements will result in the
very surprise which is to be avoided by proper Rule 26(e) prac-
tice.195
191. Dychalo v. Copperloy Corp., 78 F.R.D. 146, 148 (E.D. Pa.), affid sub nom.
Copperloy Corp. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 588 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1978).
192. Id. at 148-49.
193. See REPORT OF THE ABA COMMrrEE, note 4 supra; Brazil, The Adversary
Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L
REV. 1295 (1978); Pollack, Discovery-Its Abuse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219
(1979).
194. See, e.g., Shelak v. White Motor Co., 581 F.2d 1155, 1164 (5th Cir. 1978)
(Rubin, J., dissenting from appellate direction of new trial after trial court denial
of continuance, on rationale of majority's improper assumptions drawn from the
record). See also Weiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 515 F.2d 449, 463 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Lumbard, J., dissenting from appellate majority's finding of surprise in the rec-
ord).
195. This rule has been in effect for nearly ten years and has not been the sub-
ject of any proposal, as with many of the other discovery rules. This evidences
Only the expert witness segment of continuing discovery has
generated decisions about who should bear the burden of proving
prejudice when an undisclosed witness testifies at trial and
whether strict or liberal construction may be anticipated. Conse-
quences of noncompliance are more evident with the expert wit-
ness because of opposing counsel's limited ability to engage in
"quick-draw-hip-shooting."196 Yet the approach in such cases
constitutes viable precedent for all witness problems arising
under Rule 26(e) (1). This subsection establishes a continuing
burden as to both "persons having knowledge of discoverable
matters" and the "expert witness at trial." The propounding party
may inquire directly regarding the adversary's expert and nonex-
pert witnesses. When this is done, the responding party must
fully and seasonably supplement responses regarding such wit-
nesses. It is not suggested that supplementation problems re-
garding experts and those involving nonexperts are of equal
magnitude. However, the federal objective of avoiding surprise is
less likely to be achieved with the development of a dual line of
cases establishing more liberal construction in the case of nonex-
pert witnesses. The language of Rule 26(e) does not support such
a distinction.
Two residual problems with expert trial witness supplementa-
tion coincide with pervasive themes affecting the entire continu-
ing duty sphere. First, the question of when the supplementation
duty starts and ends frequently surfaces in the expert witness
cases. The continuing burden to supplement expert discovery re-
sponses commences at the earliest opportunity,197 as in the case
of the other discovery responses. 198 This duty does not end with
commencement of trial since nothing in Rule 26(e),199 its legisla-
tive history,200 or trial court discretion suggests any time limita-
welcomed receipt of limited continuing discovery and possibly insufficient experi-
ence or recognition of pitfalls to generate any proposed change.
196. See Shelak v. White Motor Co., 581 F.2d 1155, 1159 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1978)
(emergency preparation expected to counter undisclosed trial testimony although
an expert could not be produced on short notice). See generally Friedenthal, Dis-
covery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REV. 455
(1962).
197. Laclede Gas Co. v. G.W. Warnecke Corp., 78 F.R.D. 502, 504 (E.D. Mo. 1978)
(dismissal of counterclaim for, inter alia, failure to supplement experts at earliest
opportunity), affd, 604 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1979).
198. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 412 F. Supp. 705, 710 n.7, 711 (D.
Minn.) (sanction of $200,000 for violation of local rules, court orders, and failure to
supplement documents at first opportunity), afid, 543 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976).
199. Although there is no general duty to update responses, the express excep-
tions contained in Rule 26(e) would be readily circumvented if the limited duty to
supplement was subject to any time limitation.
200. The Advisory Committee commented: 'The issue is acute when new infor-
mation renders substantially incomplete or inaccurate an answer which was corn-
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tion.20 1 Secondly, because amending deposition responses is sig-
nificantly more time-consuming and costly than amending
interrogatory responses, there is a subtle pressure to disregard
required amendment of stale or incomplete deposition responses.
This has generated more problems with the expert deposition
than with the percipient witness deposition.202 When an expert's
deposition is given,203 counsel who retained the expert should re-
canvass its premises for supporting facts and opinions. This will
reveal whether any different information has developed that
might be used by that expert at trial. If such information has de-
veloped, the retaining party will have to supplement responses
given in the deposition usually by filing supplemental responses
to pre-deposition interrogatories that addressed the substance of
the expert's anticipated trial testimony. Failure to do so has re-
sulted in exclusion of expert testimony in both state and federal
courts, particularly where an expert's deposition is given in lieu of
answers to interrogatories.204
B. Incorrect Responses
A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he ob-
tains information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the response
was incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the response though cor-
rect when made is no longer true and the circumstances are such that a
failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing concealment.
2 0 5
plete and accurate when made." 1970 AmENDmEwNs, supra note 27, at 507. This
acuteness is not relieved or mitigated when such information comes to the atten-
tion of the burdened party during trial unless it is revealed immediately to the op-
ponent who is justifiably conducting trial in reliance upon obsolete responses.
201. Weiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 515 F.2d 449, 457 (2d Cir. 1975) (supple-
mentation of discovery responses to be tendered at the earliest opportunity).
202. A party must also supplement his deposition answers when governed by
Rule 26(e) (2) provisions regarding prior incorrect responses. See text accompany-
ing notes 205-51 infra.
203. Leave of court is required to obtain discovery of experts by means other
than interrogatory. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (4) (A) (ii). This is usually done by depo-
sition. Compare Wilson v. Resnick, 51 F.RD. 510 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (deposition of ex-
pert refused), with Herbst v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 65 F.R.D. 528 (D.
Conn. 1975) (deposition of expert permitted).
204. Voegeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89, 97 (8th Cir. 1977);'Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Robert-
shaw Controls Co., 560 F.2d 856, 858 (7th Cir. 1977); Barnes v. St. Francis Hosp. &
School of Nursing, Inc., 211 Kan. 315, 321, 507 P.2d 288, 293-94 (1973).
205. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(e) (2). Failure to amend responses regarding either "per-
sons having knowledge of discoverable matters" pursuant to Rule 26(e) (1) (A) or
the "expert witness at trial" pursuant to Rule 26(e) (1) (B) would conceptually fit
within the parameters of Rule 26(e) (2) (A) governing responses that are "incorrect
when made" or Rule 26(e) (2) (B) governing responses that are "no longer true."
However, the express language of Rule 26(e) as to witness supplementation obvi-
There are two major segments to the continuing discovery rule.
One governs witnesses and the other governs incorrect responses.
Circumstances involving their interplay suggest an unusual
anomaly. Witnesses have always been critical to the course of
most lawsuits. Adoption of the duty to supplement witness re-
sponses20 6 merely codified existing judicial power to control con-
cealment.20 7 This duty has not been analyzed critically.208 Yet
the incorrect responses segment of the supplementation rule,
equally subject to abuse and an ameliorating duty, may ulti-
mately prove to be more critical because of the greater possibility
of surprise.
The "notice" pleading approach of the federal courts209 signifi-
cantly contributes to the need for a continuing duty to supple-
ment discovery responses. Prior to the use of notice pleading,
federal litigants were required to emphasize issue formulation at
the pleading stage rather than during the discovery stage of a law-
suit. 2 10 The need for discovery response amendment is less evi-
ates any dual analysis under both Rule 26(e)(1) and 26(e)(2). Rule 26(e)(2) was
designed to avoid discovery abuse in very limited circumstances beyond the scope
of Rule 26(e) (1) governing witness supplementation. See generally 1970 AtiEND-
mENTs, supra note 27, at 508, Advisory Committee Note.
206. A federal duty was judicially suggested as early as 1940, only two years af-
ter promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. RCA Mfg. Co. v. Decca
Records, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (defendant should furnish informa-
tion acquired between answer and trial but not prohibited from offering new evi-
dence as interrogatory function not to limit evidence). Implementation of a very
limited duty was formally suggested in 1957, possibly as an outgrowth of the ef-
forts of U.S. District Court Judge Holtzoff of the District of Columbia. Compare
Note, The "Continuing" Nature of Discovery Techniques, 42 IowA L REV. 579
(1957), with Holtzoff, The Elimination of Surprise in Federal Practice, 7 VANm. L.
REV. 576, 578-80 (1954). Rule 26(e) was ultimately adopted after three years of
hearings and commentary in 1970. See 1970 AMENDMENTS, supra note 27, at 459.
207. See 1948 AmENDmENTs, note 29 supra.
208. See note 195 supra. See generally REPORT OF THE ABA ComirrrEs, note 4
supra; 1979 REVISED PRELaIMNARY DAr, note 5 supra. Neither of these suggest
any change to Rule 26(e).
209. This term was never utilized by the federal rulemakers and apparently
was rejected because of adverse connotations. See Clark, Two Decades of the Fed-
eral Civil Rules, 58 CoLuM. L REV. 435, 450-51 (1958). But see the U.S. Supreme
Court's wording that the federal rules "restrict the pleadings to the task of general
notice-giving and invest the deposition-discovery process with a vital role in prep-
aration for trial." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). See also Holtzoff, Or-
igin and Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U. L REV. 1057,
1065-66 (1955) (term "notice" pleading used by courts and commentators albeit
some question regarding technical accuracy). See generally Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 48 (1957) (specific reference to and approval of simplified "notice" plead-
ing); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (reversing dismissal for
failure to state facts sufficient to state cause of action where pro se complaint inar-
tistically disclosed rudimentary nature of claim with some possibility of relief); C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 68, at 319-25 (3d ed. 1976).
210. For a concise discussion of the role of discovery in issue formulation, see
F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, CIvIL PROCEDURE §§ 6.1, 6.2 (2d ed. 1977).
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dent in the state jurisdictions which use "fact" pleading to
identify triable theories and damages. 211
As with witnesses, seasonable amendment of incorrect re-
sponses at the earliest opportunity2 12 should be the practice with
those responses governed by Rule 26(e) (2). This practice should
apply to responses that were incorrect when made and to re-
sponses that are no longer true when the failure to amend either
type of response would be fraudulent.213 The literal distinction
between the two duties involving incorrect responses is decep-
tively simple because the practical distinction is illusive.
The original draft of this requirement of federal supplementa-
tion proposed: "A party who knows or later learns that his re-
sponse is incorrect is under a duty seasonably to correct the
response."214 This language suggested a broad continuing duty.
It would have resulted in an unlimited duty to supplement since
preliminary interrogatories are intended to elicit every conceiva-
ble scrap of discoverable information. It was deleted without
comment. The word "knows" and the phrase "later learns" appar-
ently evolved 215 into the adopted rule which significantly limited
the scope of the continuing duty to supplement.
The adopted rule greatly restricts the impact of required
amendment of discovery responses. The infirmity of this segment
of the rule is evident. If the interrogated party does not realize
211. There is some intrajurisdictional use of both fact pleading and notice
pleading. Compare CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 425.10(a) (West 1973) (statement of
facts constituting cause of action) with id. § 1824.1(b) (West Supp. 1980) (short
and plain statement of occurence or transaction upon which pleader entitled to re-
lief, as in FED. R. Crv. P. 8(a) (2)). For an analysis of the continuing duty of sup-
plementation in "fact" pleading jurisdictions, see notes 61-76 and accompanying
text supra. Illustrative law review articles and cases analyzing fact pleading are
collected in M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 115 nn. 30 & 31 (2d ed. 1979).
212. For a general overview of contemporary problems associated with expedi-
tious commencement and termination of discovery, see Cohn, Federal Discovery:
A Survey of Local Rules and Practices in View of Proposed Changes to the Federal
Rules, 63 MINN. L. REV. 253, 264-71 (1979).
213. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e) (2) (A), (B). Express use of the word "fraud," as syno-
nomous with "knowing concealment" in Rule 26(e) (2) (B), is contained in P.AB.
Produits et Appareils de Beaute v. Satinine Societa, 570 F.2d 328, 334 (C.C.P.A.
1978). See also Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1337-38, 1342 n.10 (3d Cir.
1978) (Rule 60(b) fraud basis for relief from judgment involving Rule 26(e) (2) vio-
lation).
214. See 1967 PRELImINARY DRAFT, supra note 26, at 228.
215. The original and the revised Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26(e) (2)
are identical. Compare 1967 PRELumxARY DRAFr, supra note 26, at 238, with 1970
AmENDMENTS, supra note 27, at 508.
that he provided an incorrect response, Rule 26(e) (2) (A) has not
been violated, notwithstanding his lack of diligence and the inter-
rogating party's justifiable reliance upon the incorrect response.
In the absence of any federal decision on point, it is probable that
this problem is minimized by proper pursuit of discovery by the
interrogating party or by the pretrial conference device. Further-
more, Rule 26(e) (2) (B) does not require amendment of all such
responses but only those that involve a knowing or actual con-
cealment of important2 16 incorrect responses. 217 Federal counsel
practicing in states that have not adopted this knowing conceal-
ment rule are more prone to unintentional violations.
In the absence of an explanatory advisory note discussing the
rulemakers' intended distinctions between originally incorrect re-
sponses and subsequently incorrect responses, the judiciary has
undertaken the necessary construction. Inability to distinguish
these independent segments of Rule 26(e) (2) has resulted in de-
cisions citing both duties without identifying which one was
breached.2 18 A crucial difference is that knowing concealment, an
element of the continuing duty when discovery responses are no
longer true, is not an element of the continuing duty when discov-
ery responses are incorrect when made.
1. Incorrect When Made
This aspect of federal continuing discovery has rarely been ad-
dressed in reported decisions. When it has been addressed, how-
ever, severe sanctions and ethical admonitions have accompanied
the breach. An unusual illustration is Travis Mills Corp. v. Square
216. The Advisory Committee Note cryptically states: 'This exception does not
impose a duty to check the accuracy of prior responses, but it prevents knowing
concealment by a party or attorney." 1970 AMENDMENTS, supra note 27, at 508 (em-
phasis added).
217. Professors Wright and Miller, who comment upon the limited scope of the
rule as adopted, state: "If a response was correct when made, and the party subse-
quently has actual knowledge that the response is no longer correct, he must
amend his response only if failure to do so would be 'in substance a knowing con-
cealment."' 8 C. WluGHT & A. MrLLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2049,
at 324 (1970) (emphasis added). If constructive knowledge does not suffice to evi-
dence a violation, then "knowing concealment" will remain quite difficult to prove.
218. See Phil Crowley Steel Corp. v. Macomber, Inc., 601 F.2d 342, 344 n.1 (8th
Cir. 1979) (accountant's trial testimony on damages differing from deposition testi.
mony); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1342 n.10 (5th Cir. 1978) (new trial
because of fraud involving "cost benefit analysis" not identified in response to
"trend cost estimate" interrogatory, an arguably correct response until judicially
deemed otherwise); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 5680 F.2d 856,
857 n.2 (7th Cir. 1977) (exclusion of alternative theory of recovery, undisclosed in
preliminary contention interrogatory answer, correct when answered yet charac-
terized as intended to surprise adversary). These cases cite both segments of
Rule 26(e) (2) without venturing an opinion regarding which of the two duties was
breached.
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D. Co.219 A Pennsylvania corporation brought a diversity action
against a Pennsylvania defendant. The plaintiff, in response to
the defendant's interrogatory, stated that it was a New York cor-
poration. Following entry of judgment for the plaintiff, the action
was dismissed because of lack of diversity.220 This dismissal was
premised upon plaintiff's failure to amend its incorrect response
that it was a New York corporation. Dismissal of its claim,
notwithstanding a lengthy trial, was justified "by pointing out that
the situation was brought about by the plaintiff's incorrect answer
to the [state of incorporation] interrogatory." 2 1 The court
squarely placed the blame upon the responding party's failure to
amend a prior incorrect response even though there was no evi-
dence of deception by either party.=2
The typical illustration of Rule 26(e) (2) (A) application to origi-
nally incorrect responses involves interrogatories answered at an
early stage of the litigation. A party may not be able to answer
accurately but must respond to the best of his knowledge 223 in or-
der to comply with his discovery obligations.224 For example,
original answers to interrogatories might admit the presence of a
rug at the time and place of plaintiff's slip and fall. Seasonable
amendment denying the presence of the rug would then permit
the interrogated party to rely upon the amended answers at trial.
However, amendment of the original answers will not preclude in-
troduction of the original answers by the interrogating party to ef-
fectuate the purposes of Rule 26(e) (2) (A).225
The pervasive problem with this duty is determining whether
219. 67 F.R.D. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
220. Id. at 24, 27. The federal rules provide: "Whenever it appears by sugges-
tion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject mat-
ter, the court shall dismiss the action." FED. R. Crv. P. 12(h) (3). See also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1359 (1976) (party improperly made or joined to invoke jurisdiction of a federal
court).
221. Travis Mills Corp. v. Square D. Co., 67 F.R.D. 22, 27 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
222. Id.
223. See text accompanying note 205 supra.
224. The Federal Rules provide that "an evasive or incomplete answer is to be
treated as a failure to answer." FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a) (3).
225. The interrogating party could introduce the prior answers either as an ad-
mission or for purposes of impeachment. See, e.g., Havenfleld Corp. v. H.AIL
Block, Inc., 509 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975) (Rule
26(e) (2) (B) attempted amendment cannot relieve party of impact of admission of
liability contained in original answers); Mangual v. Prudential Lines, Inc., 53
F.R.D. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (Rule 26(e) (2) (A) amendment denying presence of rug
does not preclude opponent's use of original answer to interrogatory).
ambiguous, 226 incomplete, 227 inadequate, 2 28 or grossly negli-
gent229 responses are "incorrect when made," as not every such
answer constitutes a breach of duty.230 A motion to exclude evi-
dence under Rule 26(e) (2) (A) is the appropriate procedural de-
vice to raise the issue.231 This motion is particularly appropriate
after the close of discovery when undisclosed evidence is offered
in the absence of an appropriately amended discovery response.
2. No Longer True: Concealment
The most limited aspect of the continuing duty to supplement
discovery responses is codified in Rule 26(e) (2) (B). Amendment
of a prior response, correct when made but no longer true, is not
necessary if an issue has been settled, rendered subsequently un-
important, or reformulated. As the court reasoned in the leading
case relied upon by the rulemakers, if amendments were required
in such cases, "parties [would] be burdened with the requirement
of providing a myriad of information which could prove of little
aid to either party."232 Amendment is necessary only in those
cases where failure to amend is judicially characterized as "know-
ing concealment."233
226. Dudley v. South Jersey Metal, Inc., 555 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1977) (district
court finding of ambiguous interrogatory response as "incorrect," within meaning
of Rule 26(e) (2) (A), reversed for new trial).
227. Kearsarge Computer, Inc. v. Acme Staple Co., 116 N.H. 705, 709, 366 A.2d
467, 469-70 (1976) (exclusion of evidence for failure to fully disclose requested in-
formation, relying upon Rule 26(e)). An illustrative summary of various catego-
ries of incomplete answers is contained in Deyo v. Kilbourne, 84 Cal. App. 3d 771,
149 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1978) (citing various federal and state authorities).
228. Voegeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89, 95-97 (8th Cir. 1977) (reversal and remand for
new trial because of inadequate answers identifying expert); DiGregorio v. First
Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 1974) (dismissal without finding of
wilfulness where answers to interrogatories inadequate or unresponsive).
229. Szilvassy v. United States, 71 F.R.D. 589, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (although dis-
missal within court's discretion on facts, monetary sanctions imposed upon attor-
ney for grossly negligent responses to interrogatories where extent of party's fault
not clear).
230. In reversing the trial court's exclusion of defendant's previously undis-
closed evidence, an appellate opinion succinctly stated:
Whatever the division of responsibility for the misunderstanding, de-
fendant must bear some of the blame. The question is what sanctions
would have been appropriate. Although we recognize that under our legal
system counsel owe a legal duty to each other and to the court to be can-
did in their pleadings and in discovery and not to lay a trap for the un-
wary by artful pleading or half-truths, not every ambiguous answer
warrants a sanction as extreme as that imposed in the instant case.
Dudley v. South Jersey Metal, Inc., 555 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1977).
231. See, e.g., id. at 98-99.
232. Novick v. Pennsylvania R.R., 18 F.R.D. 296, 298 (W.D. Pa. 1955). See 1970
AmENDMENTS, supra note 27, at 507, Advisory Committee Note (citing Novick).
233. The Advisory Committee Note provides no guidance as to what constitutes
"knowing concealment." See 1970 AMENDmENTS, supra note 27, at 507-08.
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The federal decisions since the 1970 adoption of Rule 26(e) are
repeatedly concerned with this scenario: through lack of dili-
gence an attorney fails to recanvass the impact of new informa-
tion, eventually fails to seasonably amend obsolete discovery
responses, and ultimately is found to have knowingly or fraudu-
lently concealed the information. A lawyer's voluminous practice
may induce an honest failure to recognize that the nature of
newly acquired information is inconsistent with prior discovery
responses. For example, an attorney may respond to a prelimi-
nary set of interrogatories that he has identified witnesses A, B,
and C. During discovery he locates witness D but is uncertain
whether D will be a good trial witness. When the case nears trial,
the attorney finally decides to use witness D but has not dis-
closed this to his adversary. However, Rule 26(e) imposes the
burden of amendment upon the responding party only to prevent
knowing concealment.234 Compliance with this aspect of Rule
26(e) is required even in the absence of legislative guidelines, as
supplementation has been judicially characterized as increasingly
necessary.2
35
Probably because of the restrictive influence of the rulemak-
ers,236 few federal courts have found requisite circumstances that
characterize the forbidden zone of knowing concealment. When
knowing concealment is found, it nearly always generates judicial
disagreement, as evidenced by a reversal of the finding on appeal
or a dissenting opinion when the finding is affirmed.23 7
234. But see id. at 508. The Advisory Committee Note cryptically states: "This
exception does not impose a duty to check the accuracy of prior responses, but it
prevents knowing concealment by a party or attorney." Id. (emphasis added).
235. The first federal decision after the effective date of Rule 26(e), noting that
supplementation would still be required in the absence of the rule, stated: "Sup-
plementation of responses in discovery proceedings is increasingly impor-
tant. . . . [setting forth Rule 26(e) ] This language appears to be clear and explicit
and will greatly clarify procedure.. . ." Rogers v. Tri-State Materials Corp., 51
F.R.D. 234, 244-45 (N.D. W.Va. 1970) (emphasis added) (plaintiff must provide fac-
tual support for negligence complaint by answering interrogatory which is subject
to continuing duty to supplement response).
236. See text accompanying notes 215-17 supra.
237. The author's research revealed only one Rule 26(e) (2) (B) "knowing con-
cealment" decision that did not result in reversal or an appellate split decision.
See United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 412 F. Supp. 705, 710 (D. Minn.), af'd, 543
F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976) (violation of Rule 26(e) because of unquestionable know-
ing concealment of documents).
Decisional formulation of what constitutes "knowing concealment" may coincide
with the chief disciplinary rule of the A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Rozier v. Ford Motor Co.,238 a wrongful death case alleging neg-
ligent fuel tank design, the plaintiff sought production of a docu-
ment. The defendant responded that it could find no such
document, a statement arguably true when made.239 One month
after this response, a defense attorney found the requested docu-
ment but did not disclose or amend the defendant's previous neg-
ative response that was no longer true. The trial court did not
construe these facts as knowing concealment. The appellate court
unanimously reversed on the grounds of a Rule 26(e) violation.240
In Shelak v. White Motor Co.,241 a strict liability action involving
an allegedly related heart attack, the majority's decision to re-
verse the trial judge was harshly criticized by the dissenting
judge who claimed that the majority had made "many assump-
tions,.. . some in disregard of the record, to find him in error."242
The defendant's pretrial interrogatory had requested disclosure of
all parts of the plaintiffs body injured as a result of the acci-
dent.24 3 The plaintiff's responses did not assert that the heart at-
tack was causally connected to the prior personal injury.
Furthermore, the assertion was not made in the complaint, but
was first tendered at the time of trial in an express violation of
Rule 26(e) (1) (B). The defendant moved unsuccessfully for exclu-
sion of expert testimony related to this new claim or, alterna-
It requires that "in his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not.., counsel or
assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent."
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSm=rrY DR 7-102(A) (7). See generally Nes-
sen, Rethinking the Lawyer's Duties to Disclose Information: A Critique of Some of
Judge Frankel's Proposals, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 677, 707-10 (1979).
Appellate reversals and split decisions occurred in Shelak v. White Motor Co.,
581 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1978); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978);
P.A.B. Produits et Appareils de Beaute v. Satinine Societa, 570 F.2d 328 (C.C.P.A.
1978); Weiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 515 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1975); Nutt v. Black
Hills Stage Lines, Inc., 452 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1971). The lone unanimous reversal of
a trial court finding of knowing concealment is reported in Dudley v. South Jersey
Metal, Inc., 555 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1977). The lone unanimous reversal of a trial court
finding of no knowing roncealment is reported in Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573
F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978).
238. 573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978) (reversal directing new trial because of previ-
ously prevailing party's failure to disclose information sought by interrogatories in
violation of Rule 26(e)).
239. Id. at 1340 n.6. If a party is uncertain whether the newly discovered docu-
ment is subject to disclosure under Rule 26(e) but does not want to unnecessarily
disgorge it, a possible remedy would be to seek an in camera ruling to avoid a sub-
sequent claim of knowing concealment and possible exclusion. But the likelihood
of success would be minimized by the modem emphasis upon full disclosure of
relevant information.
240. Id. at 1342.
241. 581 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1978).
242. Id. at 1164 (Rubin, J., dissenting). See also id. at 1161-66 nn. 1-5 & app.
243. Id. at 1157.
274
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tively, a continuance. The majority criticized the trial judge's
seizure of this opportunity to clear his calendar, possibly to aid
the plight of the litigants in a nonpriority civil case.24 The dis-
sent responded that such "[a] ssumptions, though they [were] ob-
viously made out of generous and understanding hearts," 245 did
not properly support the finding of prejudice resulting from fail-
ure to supplement.24 6 The dissent found no surprise in the heart
attack claim because there was no concealment of the heart at-
tack in other answers to defendant's interrogatories, medical re-
ports, and defendant's previous motion for a trial continuance to
undertake some additional discovery. 24 7
There are very limited circumstances that provide justification
for not finding knowing concealment, within the meaning of Rule
26(e), although a significant discovery response is no longer true.
For example, the allegedly aggrieved party may be partially re-
sponsible for his adversary's breach;24 8 new evidence should be
received to prevent manifest injustice;249 or "harsh application of
... rule [26(e) (2) (B) ] would translate into a forfeiture... ,"250
notwithstanding continued reliance upon an incorrect response
by the interrogating party.25'
244. Id. The Speedy Trial Act gives preference to criminal matters, thereby de-
laying disposition of civil cases. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976). This may influence
judges to avoid rulings that will further delay final disposition of civil matters, es-
pecially when they have finally reached the trial stage. At least one eastern fed-
eral district court sought a one-year suspension of the July 1, 1979, effective date of
the provision in the Speedy Trial Act, which now requires that defendants be
brought to trial within 100 days of indictment, because of fear that its burgeoning
caseload would prevent compliance. Los Angeles Daily Journal, June 15, 1979, at 1,
col. 1. But of. Los Angeles Daily Journal, July 4, 1979, at 1, col. 1 (reference to
Washington Post editorial criticizing the courts and prosecutors for their possibly
intentional delays in meeting deadlines in order to force either a change in the Act
or an extension of the effective date of the Act).
245. Shelak v. White Motor Co., 581 F.2d 1155, 1162 (5th Cir. 1978) (Rubin, J., dis-
senting).
246. See generally id. at 1164 nn.6-8 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 1163.
248. See Dudley v. South Jersey Metal, Inc., 555 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1977) (rever-
sal of finding that appellant deliberately misled appellee).
249. See Price v. Lake Sales Supply R.M., Inc., 510 F.2d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1974)
(no knowing concealment if propounding party in better position to answer than
answering party who failed to update interrogatory answer).
250. P.B. Prodults et Appareils de Beaute v. Satinine Societa, 570 F.2d 328, 334
(C.C.P.A. 1978) (reversal of board cancellation of trademark because registrant not
required to supplement answer to interrogatory to establish use of mark).
251. Id. at 335-36 (Baldwin, J., dissenting). For due process analysis permitting
dismissal for failure to answer interrogatories based upon information contained
Continuing discovery is expressly limited by rule. However,
supplementation beyond the relatively inflexible scope of the wit-
ness and incorrect response segments of Rule 26(e) is possible.
C. Elastic Supplementation
A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the court,
agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new re-
quests for supplementation of prior responses. 252
The two Rule 26(e) exceptions governing witnesses and incor-
rect responses were drafted to confine the burdens associated
with continuing discovery. Required recanvassing of new infor-
mation can be justified either when new witnesses are acquired
or when an opponent's reliance on incorrect responses would re-
sult in unfair surprise.
Fortunately, an elastic segment of the limited federal approach
was provided. Judicial flexibility to adjust to the circumstances of
each case, a pervasive feature of the Anglo-American legal sys-
tem, 25 3 was preserved. The Advisory Committee apparently felt
that no guidelines were necessary to aid judicial implementation
of Rule 26(e) (3).254 It permits continuing discovery beyond what
is expressly limited by other subdivisions of the rule. This is usu-
ally accomplished by court orders dealing with the particular
case, as Rule 26(e) cannot be expanded by local rules of court.255
The parties can achieve broader supplementation than expressly
permitted2 56 through mutual agreement or the unilateral filing of
another set of interrogatories by either party.2 57 The latter
method of supplementation is available "[alt any time prior to
trial,"258 unless a local rule25 9 or court order2 60 terminates discov-
in available source, see DiGregorio v. First Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 790 (3d
Cir. 1974).
252. FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(e)(3).
253. See generally F. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW
(1955).
254. See 1970 AMENDMENTS, supra note 27, at 508, Advisory Committee Note
(only guideline that pretrial conference order may impose duty to supplement).
255. In light of the Advisory Committee's intent to limit continuing discovery,
see text accompanying notes 24-81 supra, it is unlikely that a local rule imposing a
broader burden than that expressed in the rule would survive attack under Rule
83 prohibiting local rule variance from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
should this issue ever arise under Rule 26(e) (3).
256. For seven express provisions governing continuing discovery, see text ac-
companying note 116 supra.
257. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(e)(3).
258. Id.
259. See Havenfield v. H. & R. Block, Inc., 509 F.2d 1263, 1271 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975) (refusal to permit supplemental answers, otherwise re-
quired by Rule 26(e) (2) (B), after close of discovery pursuant to local rule of court
properly drawn under Rule 83).
260. A federal court has the inherent power to permit supplementation after
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ery at an earlier date. The elastic nature of Rule 26(e) (3) there-
fore permits both broader and more limited supplementation than
exists by virtue of other subdivisions of the rule. Federal proce-
dure carefully delineates the duty to amend responses in the criti-
cal witness and incorrect response zones, "yet leav[es] latitude,
under Rule 26(e) (3), in the District Courts to require supplemen-
tation of responses." 261
1. Court Order
Pretrial supplementation orders, which become the law of the
case, bind the parties to mutually exchange discoverable informa-
tion.2 62 Such orders may prohibit supplementation 263 otherwise
required by the rule.2 64
There is a significant distinction between nonsupplementation
in violation of Rule 26(e) and nonsupplementation in violation of
a court order. The latter situation triggers applicable discovery
sanctions including dismissal,265 as well as the inherent power to
the close of discovery upon a showing of good cause. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v.
Miller, 402 F.2d 134, 145 (8th Cir. 1968) (responding party permitted to utilize new
medical records because new facts were not discovered until after close of discov-
ery).
261. Rogers v. Tri-State Materials Corp., 51 F.R.D. 234, 245 (N.D. W.Va. 1970)
(first post-Rule 26(e) case, restating general principles relating to interrogatories
and supplementation before and after effective date). The referenced latitude has
not exceeded existing provisions for supplementation expressed in the rule. See
text accompanying notes 269-72 infra.
262. Tabatchnick v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 F.R.D. 49, 54 (D.N.J. 1975) (purpose of
order withdrawing nonspecified possible experts, which is to narrow factual is-
sues, would be thwarted by calling of new undisclosed expert after jury drawn,
which is contrary to purposes of supplementation rule). For a further analysis of
Tabatchnick, see text accompanying notes 182-84 supra.
263. Tabatchnick v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 F.R.D. 49, 54 (D.N.J. 1975).
264. Compare Weiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 515 F.2d 449, 457 (2d Cir. 1975)
(court ordered supplementation duty does not end with commencement of trial),
with Havenfield v. H. & R. Block, Inc., 509 F.2d 1263, 1271-72 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 999 (1975) (rule's required supplementation does not supercede local rule
or prohibit court order closing discovery at specific pretrial date).
265. See note 9 supra. The Federal Rules provide: "If a party... fails to obey
an order to provide or permit discovery ... the court in which the action is pend-
ing may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just... " FED. R. CIV. P.
37(b) (2). Dismissal for failure to supplement pursuant to Rule 26(e) (3) was en-
tered in Laclede Gas Co. v. G.W. Warnecke Corp., 78 F.R.D. 502, 503-04 (E.D. Mo.
1978), affd, 604 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1979). Dismissal, recognized as an appropriate
sanction on the facts, wag nearly entered for failure to supplement in Szilvassy v.
United States, 71 F.R.D. 589, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); United States v. Reserve Mining
Co., 412 F. Supp. 705, 710-13 (D. Minn.), affd, 543 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976).
exclude evidence because of failure to amend.266 Recent deci-
sions dealing generally with discovery267 and specifically with
Rule 26(e) (3)268 have emphasized the need for liberal interpreta-
tion of discovery procedures to effectuate discovery through the
use of sanctions.
District court supplementation orders have not created any con-
tinuing duty broader than the witness and incorrect response re-
quirements of the existing rule. Court ordered supplementation
has uniformly dealt with new experts 269 and documents 270 and
has mirrored the existing duty applicable to the various discovery
phases. 271 Courts have used supplementation orders as a re-
minder that litigants must comply with expressly stated rule re-
quirements. They have not used such orders to expand the scope
of Rule 26(e) in the only manner possible.272 This reflects
favorable judicial reaction to the limited scope, of continuing dis-
covery in the federal courts as envisioned by the rulemakers.
2. Party Agreement
Rule 26(e) and its Advisory Committee Note severely limit the
scope of the continuing duty to amend prior discovery responses.
The provision in Rule 26(e) (3) that permits supplementation by
agreement of the parties is an intentional loophole. The parties
266. See note 120 supra.
267. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S.
639, 643 (1976) (per curiam), wherein Court of Appeals improperly reversed dis-
missal for violation of court order. If appellate reversal of dismissal was left undis-
turbed, the U.S. Supreme Court felt that "parties to other lawsuits would feel freer
... to flout the discovery orders of other district courts." Id. The Supreme Court
subsequently indicated continuing concern with discovery abuse in its statement:
"As the years have passed, discovery techniques and tactics have become a highly
developed litigation art--one not infrequently exploited to the disadvantage of jus.
tice. As the Court now recognizes, the situation has reached the point where there
is serious 'concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery."' Herbert v. Lando,
441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
268. United States v. IBM Corp., 83 F.R.D. 92, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (responsive
documents created after return date of subpoena subject to production); Carlson
Companies, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp. 1080, 1101, 1103 (D. Minn.
1974) (post-complaint discovery of documents permitted without necessity of filing
supplemental complaint, particularly if complaint alleges continuing breaches and
supplemental discovery can be obtained through the filing of additional interroga-
tories).
269. Sadowski v. Bombardier Ltd., 539 F.2d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 1976); Weiss v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 515 F.2d 449, 454 (2d Cir. 1975); Tabatchnick v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 67 F.R.D. 49, 55 (D.N.J. 1975).
270. Laclede Gas Co. v. G.W. Warnecke Corp., 78 F.ID. 502, 503 (E.D. Mo. 1978),
affid, 604 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1979); Szilvassy v. United States, 71 F.R.D. 589 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
271. For the discovery tools and relevant Rule 26(e) cases, see notes 19-23
supra.
272. See note 255 supra.
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apparently may contract for continuing discovery which is
broader than otherwise required. More limited supplementation
is unlikely because of the importance of witness information and
reliance upon the continued correctness of tendered discovery re-
sponses. Presently, the possibility of such an agreement is re-
mote because of existing nonuse273 and abuse of discovery which
inherently retards the mutual exchange of pretrial information.274
The American Bar Association's Section on Litigation, recogniz-
ing that adversaries often disagree regarding pretrial discovery
matters, now recommends early judicial control as an alterna-
tive.2 75 When this recommendation is implemented, earlier judi-
cial handling of discovery problems may create an atmosphere
wherein adversaries are more likely to agree upon such matters.
If litigants could readily agree to the mutual and seasonable ex-
change of supplemented discovery information, they could avoid
the risks of possible sanctions and the costs of multiple requests
for supplementation.
3. Multiple Requests
The remaining exception to the general rule of nonsupple-
mentation of discovery responses involves new requests for infor-
mation by the interrogating party.276 This may be done either
informally2 77 or through repeated use of discovery tools such as
multiple sets of interrogatories 278 or multiple requests for the pro-
duction of documents.2 79 The use of these means of obtaining in-
formation regarding new witnesses or obsolete responses is not
273. Discovery abuse is often, if not primarily, generated by nonuse. See P.
CONNOLLY, E. HoLLEtiAN & M. KuHLmAN, JuDiciAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGA-
TIVE PROCESS: DIScOvERY 28 (Federal Judicial Center District Court Study Series
1978).
274. REPORT OF THE ABA COMM Ir=E, supra note 4, at 5-7. The only reported
case ostensibly dealing With the possibility of such an agreement involved an un-
successful court suggestion that the parties so agree. See Carlson Companies, Inc.
v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp. 1080, 1104 (D. Minn. 1974).
275. REPORT OF THE ABA COMMITEE, supra note 4, at 5.
276. FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(e) (3) (new requests for supplementation of prior re-
sponses); FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a) (frequency not limited absent court order).
277. The consequences of informal requests for supplementation, even if origi-
nal responses have been obtained, may be delay and sanctions. See generally
Szilvassy v. United States, 71 F.R.D. 589, 590-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
278. See, e.g., P.A.B. Produits et Appareils de Beaute v. Satinine Societa, 570
F.2d 328, 335 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (Miller, J., dissenting).
279. See, e.g., Carlson Companies, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp.
1080, 1103-04 (D. Minn. 1974).
limited280 unless the interrogated party obtains a protective or-
der.2 81
The practical need for this exception to the continuing duty rule
has been mitigated by the existing duty to amend witness re-
sponses and incorrect responses imposed by Rule 26(e) (1) and
(2). Ironically, the interrogated party who receives a set of sup-
plementary interrogatories or a supplemental document request
may justifiably protest that much of the requested discovery is
duplicative.282 Continuing discovery should reduce the volume
and frequency of discovery requests. Rule-oriented decisions
continue to note that the aggrieved party could have requested
supplementation of prior responses pursuant to Rule 26(e) (3).283
This is an unusual admonition as the burdened party is already
subject to the supplementation requirements of Rule 26(e). This
should result in the desired supplementation without resort to
filing new requests for supplementation under Rule 26(e) (3).
The authentic need for additional requests for supplemental in-
formation exists when amended pleadings, party agreement, or
other major developments have altered the course of the initial
litigation and preliminary discovery information. These are the
circumstances which properly result in altering the impact of ear-
lier responses, necessitating substantial reformation of prior dis-
covery inquiries.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR MORE EFFECTIVE TMPLEMENTATION
A. Seasonable Court Ordered Supplementation
There is no express sanction for violating Rule 26(e). No refer-
ence to enforcement was made when the rule was originally pro-
posed.284 The final Advisory Committee Note provides limited
guidance, stating only: '"The duty will normally be enforced, in
those limited circumstances where it is imposed, through sanc-
tions imposed by the trial court, including exclusion of evidence,
continuance, or other action, as the court may deem appropri-
ate."285 This basis for imposing sanctions is theoretically ob-
280. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
281. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Supplementation by multiple depositions, physical
examinations, and possibly requests for admissions should not be tolerated be-
cause of the comparative burden and expense.
282. See, e.g., Carlson Companies, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp.
1080, 1104 (D. Minn. 1974) (premature second supplemental document request).
283. See, e.g., P.A.B. Produits et Appareils de Beaute v. Satinine Societa, 570
F.2d 328, 335 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (Miller, J., dissenting); Carlson Companies, Inc. v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp. 1080, 1103 (D. Minn. 1974).
284. See 1967 PRELmARY DRAnt, supra note 26, at 237-38.
285. 1970 AmENDlmENTs, supra note 27, at 508 (emphasis added).
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scure.2 86 The express federal sanctions for failure to make
discovery usually do not apply.28 7 Rule 37 remedies may be in-
voked only for violation of a court order288 or for failure to re-
spond to discovery requests.2 9 Furthermore, the harsh Rule 37
sanctions of establishment-preclusion orders, striking pleadings,
and contempt 29 0 are available only in the rare situations involving
noncompliance with court-ordered updating of discovery re-
sponses. 291 They have been imposed only in cases of gross viola-
tions of Rule 26(e).2 92
Failure to supplement prior discovery responses usually sur-
faces during trial without violating a relevant court order.293 The
court may then draw upon its inherent power to fashion appropri-
ate sanctions in the absence of a court order.294 This amorphous
286. Leading commentators have discerned that "there is some theoretical diffi-
culty in divining the source of the power to impose these sanctions." 8 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2050, at 325 (1970).
287. FED. R. CIv. P. 37. See Note, Proposed 1967Amendments to the Federal Dis-
covery Rules, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 271, 293-94 (1968). A recent proposal to expand
Rule 37 to govern all discovery violations was rejected. Compare 1978 PRELnMI-
NARY DRAFT, supra note 5, at 652-53, with 1979 REVISED PRELnNARY DRAFr, supra
note 5, at 344-48.
288. The general sanction rule provides: "If a party... fails to obey an order to
provide or permit discovery . .. the court in which the action is pending may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just . .. ." FED. . Cirv. P.
37(b) (2). Rule 37 is the exclusive express authority for discovery sanctions. So-
ciete Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958).
289. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a), (c), (d).
290. FED. 1R. CIrv. P. 26(b) (2).
291. See generally cases cited notes 269-70 supra.
292. Laclede Gas Co. v. G.W. Warnecke Corp., 78 F.R.D. 502, 504 (E.D. Mo. 1978),
af'd, 604 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1979) (counterclaim dismissed without prejudice for
defendant's failure to, inter alia, comply with court ordered submission of expert
witness list); Tabatchnick v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 F.R.D. 49, 55 (D.N.J. 1975) (pre-
cluding one of two experts from testifying after jury impanelled for violation of
pretrial order requiring identity of all experts).
293. But cf. Havenfield v. H. & R. Block, Inc., 509 F.2d 1263, 1272 (8th Cir.) (re-
fusal to permit supplemental answers, otherwise required by rule, subsequent to
close of discovery), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975).
294. See generally 8 C. WIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2050, at 325-26 (1970); Note, Proposed 1967 Amendments to the Federal Discovery
Rules, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 271, 293 (1968), wherein it is suggested:
Societe Internationale held that Rule 37 is the sole source of sanctions for
the discovery violations described in the Rule. Proposed Rule 37 does not
restate this proposition, perhaps because of the danger that such a provi-
sion would be read as implying the rule is the sole source of sanctions for
any discovery violation.
(footnotes omitted). This rationale may explain the Advisory Committee's recent
deletion of its 1978 proposal to expand Rule 37 sanctions to govern all forms of dis-
situation could be ameliorated by trial court emphasis on season-
able court-ordered supplementation under Rule 26(e). It would
be overly optimistic to assume that the required mutual exchange
of discovery information has resulted from the existing duty "im-
posed" by Rule 26(e). When a violation is exposed at trial,295 the
judge may exercise the inherent power to take "action, as the
court may deem appropriate, 296 but cannot resort to Rule 37
sanctions because of the absence of a preexisting court order to
supplement discovery responses. Judicial attention to this dis-
crepancy at an earlier stage of the litigation would give Rule 26(e)
the importance it merits.
Attention to the continuing duty requirements should be mani-
fested at the initial pretrial conference. A federal court has the
express authority to summon counsel to a pretrial conference af-
ter which it may issue an order controlling the subsequent course
of the entire lawsuit.2 97 The Advisory Committee Note to Rule
26(e) already provides for court-ordered supplementation in any
"particular case, (including an order resulting from a pretrial con-
ference) ."298 It is arguable that the drafters intended narrow judi-
cial construction on a case-by-case basis. However, the broad
purpose in establishing continuing discovery in the 1970 Amend-'
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was to avoid unfair
surprise. Since the Federal Rules are to be liberally construed to
effectuate this purpose,299 there is a growing need to order sup-
covery violations, including ones not expressed in the rule itself. Compare 1978
PRELnmNARY DRAFT, supra note 5, at 652-53, with 1979 REvisED PRELM NARY
DRAFT, supra note 5, at 344-46.
295. An undisclosed percipient witness or expert witness may be called upon
by the defaulting party to testify at trial, or the interrogating party may demon-
strate justified reliance upon the interrogated party's discovery responses which
are incorrect. These circumstances continue to generate the unfair surprise
sought to be eliminated by the adoption of Rule 26(e) in 1970. See cases cited
.notes 117-251 supra.
For a discussion of trial court and appellate remedies, see EEOC v. Carter Car-
buretor, Inc., 577 F.2d 43, 45 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 865 (1979) (collat-
eral order doctrine, appealability for denial of injunction, and mandamus); Rozier
v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1339 (5th Cir. 1978) (motions for relief from judg-
ment and new trial).
296. 1970 AMENDMENTS, supra note 27, at 508, Advisory Committee Note.
297. The Federal Rules provide:
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the
parties to appear before it for a conference to consider
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses.
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
FED. R. Crv. P. 16.
298. 1970 AmENDMENTS, supra note 27, at 508.
299. See, e.g., the court's statement that "the 1946 amendments to Rule 26 and
recent commentary and court interpretations indicate the need for a more liberal
interpretation of discovery procedures." Carlson Companies, Inc. v. Sperry &
[VOL. 17: 233, 19801 Supplementation of Discovery
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
plementation as long as Rule 37 sanctions remain otherwise inac-
cessible. 30 0
Many federal courts consider discovery matters in preliminary
pretrial conferences conducted at the close of the pleading stage
of a lawsuit.301 They should augment the function of the confer-
ence by ordering compliance with the continuing duty require-
ments of Rule 26(e). This would trigger the applicability of Rule
37 sanctions30 2 and avoid the Supreme Court's disdain for tradi-
tional leniency in failing to devise and impose sanctions to deter
violations of court orders. 30 3
B. Counsel's Liability for Excessive Costs
In the absence of a court order, the condition precedent for
Rule 37 sanctions for violating Rule 26(e), courts are expected to
rely upon their inherent powers to fashion an appropriate rem-
edy.304 The recently proposed amendment to Rule 37 would have
extended its reach to additional30 discovery violations. 306 It
Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp. 1080, 1101 (D. Minn. 1974) (interrogatories inquiring
about post-complaint activities not objectionable).
300. Professors Wright and Miller state:
Failure to supplement a response--or'making an incorrect response in the
first instance-is not one of the kinds of flagrant misconduct listed in Rule
37(d) for which the sanctions of that section are available. The sanctions
of Rule 37(b) may be imposed only for a violation of a court order under
Rule 35 or 37(a) requiring a party to provide or permit discovery.
8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2050, at 325 (1970)
(emphasis added). Rule 37 states that if "a party fails to obey an order to provide
or permit discovery, including an order made under subdivision (a) of this rule or
Rule 35, the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard
to the failure as are just ... ." FED. R. CIrv. P. 37(b) (2) (emphasis added). The
courts could readily interpret this rule as not limiting its applicability to Rules 35
and 37(a). This would permit the court to characterize violations of Rule 26(e), on
a case-by-case basis, as authorizing the imposition of the harsh sanctions con-
tained in Rule 37(b) if the court had previously ordered supplementation under
Rule 26(e) (3) at a pretrial conference or any hearing on any motion.
301. See 1979 REVISED PRELIMINARY DRAFr, supra note 5, at 332.
302. See note 300 supra.
303. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639
(1976) (per curiam). See Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposi-
tion of Discovery Sanctions, 91 Hanv. L REV. 1033, 1038-44 (1978). Gaps in civil
discovery sanctions exist in state statutory schemes which may also foster such
leniency. See, e.g., Comment, The Decline and Fall of Sanctions in California Dis-
covery: Time to Modernize California Code of Civil Procedure Section 2034, 9
U.S.F. L. REV. 360 (1974) (§ 2034 patterned after Rule 37 of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
304. See note 120 supra.
305. But cf. note 294 supra.
306. See 1978 PRELImIARY DRAYT, supra note 5, at 652.
would have expressly empowered the federal courts to impose
sanctions for any form of abuse; however, it was rejected. 307
The usual "inherent power" sanctions for violating Rule 26(e)
are exclusion of evidence, continuance, and new trial.308 Reluc-
tance to use them30 9 suggests the interim need for a sanction
somewhere between the "inherent power" sanctions and the
"harsh" sanctions arguably applicable for a violation of court-or-
dered supplementation. 310
The United States Judicial Code provides: "Any attorney...
who so multiplies the proceedings in any case as to increase costs
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to
satisfy personally such excess costs."311 This remedy is sug-
gested for those situations in which attorney's fees are unavaila-
ble because of the absence of a court order. This remedy for
violating Rule 26(e) would be analogous to those decisions under
Rule 37(b) (2) that personally assess attorney's fees against de-
serving counsel.312 Application of this express sanction, although
generally limited to statutorily taxable costs, could be extended to
Rule 26(e) cases.3 13
307. The initial Advisory Committee Note stated: 'The new subdivision [pro-
posed Rule 37(e)] is offered to make explicit the power of the court to impose
sanctions for all forms of discovery abuse." Id. at 653. The referenced proposal
was deleted from the 1979 revision of the preliminary draft. Compare 1978 PRELe-
iNARY DRAFr, supra note 5, at 652-53, with 1979 REVISED PRELIMuINARY DRAFr, SUpra
note 5, at 346-48. For a conceivable reason, see note 294 supra.
308. 1970 AMENDMENTS, supra note 27, at 508, Advisory Committee Note. See,
e.g., Shelak v. White Motor Co., 581 F.2d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir. 1978) (new trial di-
rected by appellate reversal, because of failure to grant continuance to meet new
evidence not disclosed pursuant to Rule 26(e)); Dychalo v. Copperloy Corp., 78
F.R.D. 146, 148 (E.D. Pa.) (motions for vacation of judgment and new trial denied
as Rule 26(e) substantially complied with), affd sub noma. Copperloy Corp. v. Con-
goleum Indus., Inc., 588 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1978).
309. See generally Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 480 (1958); Comment, The Decline and Fall of Sanctions in Califor-
nia Discovery: Time to Modernize California Code of Civil Procedure Section 2034,
9 U.S.F. L. REV. 360 (1974); see also Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in
the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARv. L REV. 1033 (1978).
310. See note 300 supra.
311. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976) (emphasis added).
312. See, e.g., Szilvassy v. United States, 71 F.R.D. 589, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
where the court determined that:
Since it is not clear to what extent, if any, plaintiff was at fault, and since
it is abundantly clear to what extent plaintiff's counsel is at fault (as de-
scribed above), the Court declines to dismiss the action, but will require
plaintiff's counsel (and not plaintiff) to pay the reasonable expenses of
this motion, including attorney's fees.
Id. (footnote omitted).
313. Statutory fees include fees of the clerk, marshall, court reporter, printing,
and witnesses. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1976). See generally Adlung v. Gotthardt, 257 F.
2d 199, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (cost assessment partly governed by statute and partly
governed by usage); W.F. & John Barnes Co. v. International Harvester Co., 145
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Courts are understandably reluctant to exclude evidence be-
cause this may deprive a party of its only claim or defense.31 4
Continuances burden the federal courts, which are understanda-
bly anxious to dispose of civil cases. New trials generate costly
delay. Where such remedies are deemed appropriate, the excess
costs should be borne by the attorney3 ' 5 who knowingly fails to
update stale responses upon receipt of new information regarding
witnesses or incorrect responses. In cases involving flagrant vio-
lations of Rule 26(e), costs associated with continuance, new trial,
or reversal for excluding or permitting undisclosed evidence
should be personally taxed to the defaulting attorney316 on the
authority of section 1927 of the Judicial Code.
Courts preferring to limit this proposal to statutory grounds
could assess double or multiple costs. 31 7 More daring implemen-
tation may be appropriate in the aftermath of National Hockey
League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club criticism of traditional reluc-
F.2d 915, 917 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 850 (1945) (allowance of costs in
federal court rests upon usage rather than express statutory enactment); Telsa
Elec. Co. v. Scott, 101 F. 524 (E.D. Pa. 1900) (ultimate power to impose costs had to
be found in statutes).
314. As stated by the appellate court in reversing the trial court's exclusion of
evidence for breach of Rule 26(e)(2): "When the district court prevented SJM
from presenting evidence that it did not manufacture the additional section to the
table [which injured the plaintiff], it virtually destroyed SJM's sole defense. We
must therefore reverse the judgment of the district court." Dudley v. South Jersey
Metal, Inc., 555 F.2d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 1977).
315. As stated by the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 26(e):
Although the party signs the answers, it is his lawyer who understands
their significance and bears the responsibility to bring answers up to date.
In a complex case all sorts of information reaches the party, who little un-
derstands its bearing on answers previously given to interrogatories. In
practice, therefore, the lawyer under a continuing burden must periodi-
cally recheck all interrogatories and canvass all new information.
1970 AMENDMENTs, supra note 27, at 507. Knowing failure is suggested as a means
of determining when to impose such costs. This sanction would be best imple-
mented only when counsel's violation is willful or amounts to concealment within
the meaning of Rule 26(e). A more stringent recommendation, in the opinion of
this author, is unjustified in the absence of judicial experience with the less strin-
gent proposal regarding willful concealment.
316. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 was amended to permit personal assessment upon the at-
torney as a result of the decision in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Steiner, 201 F. 63
(2d Cir. 1912). This addition was apparently approved by the Supreme Court.
Weiss v. United States, 227 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1955) (per curiam), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 936, rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 977 (1956) (costs assessed personally upon at-
torney).
317. See Acevedo v. INS, 538 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1976) (double costs personally
taxed against counsel for frivolous petition interposed solely as delaying tactic).
tance to impose sanctions.318 Courts may venture an extension of
section 1927 to recoup the innocent party's attorney's fees, in ad-
vance of trial,3 19 although nonstatutory costs have been taxed
sparingly.3 20 Otherwise, the rulemakers' invitation to the judici-
ary to enforce the duty to supplement prior responses will be a
futile gesture.3 2 1
318. Recent commentary regarding § 1927 recognizes its theoretical utility as a
judicial sanction. Compare Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement-
Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 Miuu. L
REV. 1, 47-50 (1976) (avows possibility of extra-statutory development), with Cohn,
Federal Discovery: A Survey of Local Rules and Practices in View of Proposed
Changes to the Federal Rules, 63 MmN. L. REv. 253, 294 (1979) (disavows possibility
of extra-statutory development).
319. See, e.g., Euler v. Waller, 295 F.2d 765, 767 (10th Cir. 1961) (seeking nonstat-
utory costs necessitates pretrial approving order); Hill v. Gonzalez, 53 F.R.D. 1, 3
(D. Minn. 1971) (proper procedure for taxing item not listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 is
application for approving order prior to trial); Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 24
F.R.D. 305, 314 (D. Del. 1959) (failure to obtain court order approving costs not
listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920).
320. See, e.g., Hohensee v. Basalyga, 50 F.R.D. 230 (M.D. Pa. 1969), a.fid, 429 F.2d
982 (3d Cir. 1970) (analyzes history of sparing taxation of nonstatutory costs).
321. The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 26(e), apparently providing enforce-
ment machinery to the judiciary, establishes the following guideline: "The duty
will normally be enforced, in those limited circumstances where it is imposed,
through sanctions imposed by the trial court, including exclusion of evidence, con-
tinuance, or other action, as the court may deem appropriate." 1970 AIMENDMENTS,
supra note 27, at 508 (emphasis added).
